Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics.pdf - Arystoteles - The9

350 BC

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

by Aristotle

translated by W. D. Ross

BOOK I

EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit,

is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has

rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a

certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others

are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where

there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the

products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many

actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of

the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of

strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall

under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned

with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this

and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts

fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts

are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the

sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference

whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or

something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the

sciences just mentioned.

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for

its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and

if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for

at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire

would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the

chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence

on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more

likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at

least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or

capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most

authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And

politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains

which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each

class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should

learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities

to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since

politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it

legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from,

the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this

end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a

single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events

something greater and more complete whether to attain or to

preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one

man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for

city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims,

since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the

subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for

alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the

crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science

investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so

that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by

nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they

bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by

reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must

be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses

to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about

things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the

same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit,

therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the

mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of

things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is

evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a

mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a

good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a

good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an

all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is

not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is

inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions

start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends

to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable,

because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes

no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character;

the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing

each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to

the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire

and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such

matters will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be

expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all

knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we

say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods

achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for

both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that

it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being

happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the

many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it

is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour;

they differ, however, from one another- and often even the same man

identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill,

with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they

admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their

comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there

is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all

these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were

perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most

prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference

between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato,

too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to

do, 'are we on the way from or to the first principles?' There is a

difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the

judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin

with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses-

some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must

begin with things known to us. Hence any one who is to listen

intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally,

about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in

good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is

sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as

well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get

startingpoints. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let

him hear the words of Hesiod:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;

Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;

But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart

Another's wisdom, is a useless wight.

Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we

digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of

the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the

good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love

the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent

types of life- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the

contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite

slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but

they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those

in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of

the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement

and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is,

roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too

superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to

depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives

it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not

easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order

that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of

practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who

know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according

to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even

suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political life.

But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue

seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong

inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and

misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy,

unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of

this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the

current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we

shall consider later.

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and

wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely

useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather

take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for

themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many

arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave

this subject, then.

We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss

thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an

uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by

friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better,

indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to

destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers

or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to

honour truth above our friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of

classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority

(which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an

Idea embracing all numbers); but the term 'good' is used both in the

category of substance and in that of quality and in that of

relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature

to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of

being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these

goods. Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it

is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of

reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e.

of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in

time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right

locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally

present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been

predicated in all the categories but in one only. Further, since of

the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would

have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many

sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g. of

opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in

disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine

and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the

question, what in the world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is

the case) in 'man himself' and in a particular man the account of

man is one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they will in

no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will 'good itself' and

particular goods, in so far as they are good. But again it will not be

good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no

whiter than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to

give a more plausible account of the good, when they place the one

in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have

followed.

Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics.pdf

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