Erler; Socrates in the Cave; Platonic epistemology and the common man.pdf

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S OCRATES IN THE C AVE .

P LATONIC E PISTEMOLOGY AND THE C OMMON M AN

1 . It is well known that Plato defines knowledge in terms of ontological

categories. Real knowledge for him means grasping the ideas. This

knowledge can be gained by searching within oneself . Only philosophers,

however, are able to attain knowledge this way, transforming themselves

into the status of gods as far as it is possible for men. 1 Plato clearly

describes an ideal in the dialogues. But Plato also addresses the common

man’s potential for achieving knowledge despite his deficient condition in

comparison to the Platonic ideal. In the famous simile of the cave in the

Republic , Plato offers a quite realistic view of common man as being

emprisoned in a world of becoming. 2 This prisoner takes pictures on the

wall for reality. In order to be freed from this illusion, he has to be

turned around toward truth. The prisoners, however, are not able to turn

around themselves without help from outside. What they need is a teacher

who asks them questions and gets them into conceptual difficulties

( aporiai ). 3 Common man also is likely to have emotions, desires, and

* This is part of a larger project that also will deal both with Plato and the

tradition of the metaphor ‘child in man’ in ancient philosophical contexts.

1 Passages: D. Sedley: ‘Becoming like God’ in the Timaeus and Aristotle‘,

in: T. Calvo, L. Brisson (edd.): Interpreting the Timaeus – Critias .

Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum. Selected Papers (Sankt

Augustin 1997) [ International Plato Studies 9], 327-339 and D. Sedley:

‘The Ideal of Godlikeness,’ in: G. Fine (ed.): Plato 2. Ethics, Politics,

Religion, and the Soul (Oxford 1999), 309-328.

2 Th. A. Szlezák: ‘Das Höhlengleichnis (Buch VII 514a-521b und 539d-

541b),’ in: O. Höffe (Hg.) Platon, Politeia (Berlin 1997) [ Klassiker

auslegen 7], 205-228.

3 Cf.: R. 515c, see: J. Annas: An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford

1989), 258f. and M. Erler: ‘Hilfe der Götter und Erkenntnis des Selbst.

Sokrates als Göttergeschenk bei Platon und den Platonikern,’ in: Th.

Kobusch, M. Erler (edd.): Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des

spätantiken Denkens. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses vom 13.-17.

März 2001 in Würzburg (Munich, Leipzig 2002) [BzA 160], 387-413. N.

Delhey (‘ Bemerkungen zur Bildungstheorie

in Platons Politeia ,’ in: Hermes 122 (1994), 44-54, esp. 47ff.) rightly

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fears that make him deaf to rational persuasion, and that might overpower

his rational thinking and cause him to act against his will ( R. 519a-b).

The teacher therefore must try to create the kind of disposition in his

partner that prepares him to accept the results of rational arguments,

makes him realize what is true and what is false, and helps him to

transform this knowledge into moral behavior. 4 In the Timaeus , Plato

postulates that both the immortal rational self and the mortal self need

therapy ( Ti. 90a-c), in order “to set even the baser part of us on the right

path in this way” (71d, transl. Cornford). Of course, Plato believes that

one can achieve real knowledge only if one focuses on the immortal soul.

But as the Athenian stranger in the Laws shows, moral practice too is of

crucial importance for gaining knowledge. Harmonizing the parts of the

soul and controlling desires and fears, which are located in the mortal part

of the soul, require self-control. 5

For the common man, the therapy of the mortal self and the

proper control of affections are essential for developing the right habits

that provide the foundation for virtue and real knowledge. Paramythia ,

the therapy of human passion that produces a particular emotional change

in man so that he becomes more amenable to advice and a better learner

( Lg. 718cd), is central in the so-called ‘little or basic Paideia ’ not only in

the Laws (734e-735a), but also in the Republic . Without this

groundwork, this praeparatio philosophica , common man will fail to act

in accordance with the judgements and insights that emerge from

conversation. To resist right opinion is regarded as lack of knowledge. 6

2. The theoretical underpinning for the phenomenon that emotions,

desires, or affections like fear can prevent one from accepting the results

stresses, that this does not happen simply by nature (so L. C. H. Chen:

‘Education in General ( Rep. 518c4-519b5),’ in: Hermes 115 (1987), 66-

72), but by force.

4 Cf. R. 401d-402a.

5 M. Erler: ‘Epicurus as deus mortalis . Homoiosis theoi and Epicurean

Self-cultivation,’ in: D. Frede, A. Laks (edd.): Traditions of Theology.

Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath (Leiden

2002) [ Philosophia Antiqua 89], 159-181, esp. 165f.

6 Cf. Lg. 689a; see: K. Schöpsdau: Platon , Nomoi (Gesetze) Buch I-III.

Übersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen 1994) [ Platon, Werke 9,2], 414-

17.

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of rational argument is the soul’s partitioning which Plato develops in the

Republic . This partitioning of the soul explains why reason sometimes is

overcome by emotion against its will. 7

Often this is regarded to be a new insight of Plato’s in the

Republic , because no evidence for the soul’s partitioning can be found

before the Republic . This is the thesis I wish to challenge. I shall argue

that Plato in the Phaedo playfully considers the existence of something in

man that is responsible for emotions, desires, and fear, and that is distinct

from both the body and the rational soul. In the Phaedo , Plato even gives

this source of emotions a name: he calls it the ‘child in man’ --and he

illustrates how it should be treated by therapeutic arguments, in order to

create a disposition that is amenable to rational thinking. I also wish to

draw attention to the fact that both this metaphor and the method of

praeparatio philosophica for gaining knowledge was to play an important

role in the philosophical curriculum from Plato onwards, in Hellenistic

philosophy as well as in the Platonism of imperial times. 8

3. Let us have a look at the Phaedo . In this dialogue, Socrates illustrates

the power of the logos or rational argument in helping Socrates to be

brave and fearless in the face of death, and enabling him to accept rational

arguments in favor of the soul’s immortality. Contrary to common

opinion, this dialogue does not teach one how to repress emotions because

these are the effect of the soul’s imprisonment in the body. 9 Rather, the

Phaedo illustrates how to handle emotions that spring from a source that

is distinct from the body, emotions which cannot be eradicated, but have

to be controlled, because they disturb rational thinking. The exemplum

Socratis illustrates how this can be done successfully. His partners Crito,

7 Ll. P. Gerson: Knowing Persons. A Study in Plato (Oxford 2003), 265.

I doubt that Ch. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast. His Later Ethics and

Politics (Oxford 2002), is right in arguing that this partitioning of the

soul in the Republic later was regarded as an error by Plato and corrected

in the Laws .

8 I hope to develop this elsewhere.

9 See D. Gallop: ‘Emotions in the Phaedo ,’ in: A. Havlícek, F. Karfík

(Edd.): Plato's Phaedo, Proceedings of the Second Symposium

Platonicum Pragense (Prague 2001), 275-286; cf. J. Dalfen, ‘Philologia

und Vertrauen: Über Platons eigenartigen Dialog Phaidon ,’ in: GB 20

(1994), 35-57.

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Cebes, and Simmias, on the other hand, illustrate what happens if

emotions prevail, and man is not able to subordinate these to reason.

Crito, for his part, remains unmoved by the arguments, and draws wrong

conclusions (115c). Cebes and Simmias, in contrast, are used to

arguments. They are well prepared to follow Socrates’ arguments in

favor of the soul’s immortality, and to accept the conclusions of rational

thinking. Nevertheless, they do display insecurity and distrust, while not

being able to give a reason for this unease. Something within them is out

of control and prevents them from accepting the results of what they agree

are coherent arguments. 10 This deep-rooted fear Socrates wishes to treat

by means of his ‘paramythic’ arguments, with which he wishes to address

both the ratio and the emotions of his partners. 11

It is interesting that in this context, Plato’s Socrates does not

locate Cebes’ and Simmias’ emotions in the body, as he does elsewhere in

the Phaedo . 12 No, Plato invents a metaphor to describe the source of the

affections of Socrates’ partners and the target of Socrates’ therapeutic

argumentation. At one point, Socrates suspects that Cebes and Simmias

are afraid like children that wind might disperse the soul after death.

Cebes points out that it is not he himself who is afraid, but that rather

something within himself --a child within himself, as he calls it-- is full of

fear, like children of a bogey (77d-e). He therefore begs Socrates (77d):

“Try to convince us, then, Socrates, on the assumption that we are afraid;

or rather, not as though we are afraid - perhaps there is a child inside us 13

10 Cf. Phd . 77e, 91c-d. 107b.

11 Socrates characterizes his arguments as ‘ paramythia ’ (

)

( Phd. 70b, 83a).

12 Cf. Phd. 81b-c, 94b-c. See: N. Blössner: ‘Sokrates und sein Glück,

oder: Warum hat Platon den Phaidon geschrieben?,’ in: A. Havlícek, F.

Karfík (Edd.): Plato's Phaedo, Proceedings of the Second Symposium

Platonicum Pragense (Prag 2001), 96-139, esp. 129ff.

13 Phd. 77e. I agree with Wyttenbach ( Platonis Phaedo, explanatus et

emendatus prolegomenis et annotatione Dan. Wyttenbachii , Lugdunum

Batavorum 1810) that the metaphor has to be understood as ‘child within

us’ and I disagree with Ficino ( Platonis opera translatione Marsilii

Ficini, emendatione et ad Graecum codicem collatione Dimonis Grynaei

1533) and others, who translate inter nos puer . There has been a

discussion as to whether the metaphor means doubtful reason (Chr. F.

Williger: ‘Il

Di Cebes Nel

Di Platone,’ in: GM 1 (1946),

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that is apprehensive in this way. So try to persuade him not to be afraid of

the bogey Death. Try to persuade him, then, to stop being afraid of death

as if it were a bogey-man.” And Socrates consents readily: “You must

sing charms over him ( epodai ), said Socrates, every day, until you have

charmed the fear out of him.”

‘ To charm the fear out of the child in man as philosophical

praeparatio, ’ this is what Socrates’ rational arguments in the Phaedo are

meant to accomplish. This is what Socrates’ ‘ paramythia ’ and

philosophical ‘ epode ’ 14 are for: to combine rational arguments with

therapeutic intentions.

It is useful at this point to remind ourselves that the metaphor

the ‘child in man which needs persuasion in order to rid itself of the fear

of death’ has a ‘ Sitz im Leben.’ It forms part of the paideia that tries to

make children act properly. Plato wishes to remind us of the ‘old wives’

tales that nurses told children in Greece, as people still do today, in order

to frighten children into obedience: “If you don’t do such and such, a

monster will come and eat you.” Those traditional tales are meant to

create fear in children, and thereby a disposition to accept advice. 15

103-113) or an irrational part of the soul (G. Capone Braga, ‘Il

"Fanciullino" Di Cebete,’ in: GM 2,1947, 60-62, with a response by Chr.

F. Williger: ‘Ancora Sul "Fanciullino" Di Cebete,’ in: GM 2, 1947, 262-

264); see also C. H. Young: ‘A Delicacy in Plato's Phaedo ,’ in: CQ NS

38,1988, 250-251).

14 Cf. P. Lain-Entralgo: ‘Die platonische Rationaliserung der Besprechung

( ) und die Erfindung der Psychotherapie durch das Wort,’ in:

Hermes 86 (1958), 298-323. Epode as rational argument: cf. Plat. Chrm.

156e-157a; Phd. 77e, Lg. 903a-b, and Chr. Bobonich, ‘Persuasion,

Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's Laws ,’ in: CQ NS 41 (1991), 365-

388, bes. 374. The Charmides shows, that philosophical argument and

teaching should follow the protreptic praeparatio philosophica by means

of the aporia. Cf. M. Erler: Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen

Platons (Berlin, New York 1987) [ UaLG 25], 211f.

15 Cf. A. Scobie: ‘Storytellers, Storytelling, and the Novel in Graeco-

Roman Antiquity,’ in: RhM 122 (1979), 229-259 and G. Heldmann:

Märchen und Mythos in der Antike? Versuch einer Standortbestimmung

(Munich, Leipzig 2000) [ BzA 137], 95ff., who does not mention the

passage in the Phaedo .

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