The Military Balance 2012.pdf

Index of TablEs

Essays

1 Operation Odyssey Dawn ...............................................................14

2 Operation Uniied Protector ...........................................................14

North america

3 DoD’s War Budget Authority by Title FY2010 ............................43

4 US National Defense Budget Authority FY2008–FY2011 .....44

5 Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Overseas

Contingency Operations FY2001–FY2011 (US$bn) ................45

6 US National Defense Budget Function and Other

Selected Budgets 1992, 2002–2012 .............................................46

7 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries,

North America ......................................................................................69

Europe

8 NATO Europe Gross Government Debt and

Real Defence Expenditure 2008–101 ...........................................74

9 French Defence Budget Proposals ................................................78

Notiications of October 2010 Proposed US

Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia ($bn) .......................... 315

Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries,

Middle East and North Africa ....................................................... 357

latin america and the Caribbean

Latin America Defence Expenditure 2010–2011:

Top 10 and Sub-Regional Breakdown (US$ bn) .................... 364

Brazilian Defence Expenditure by Function (R$ m) ............. 368

Breakdown of Brazilian Defence Budget (2011)

(R$ m) ................................................................................................... 369

Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries,

Latin America and the Caribbean .............................................. 408

sub-saharan africa

South African Defence Budget by Programme,

2007–2013 .......................................................................................... 418

Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries,

Sub-Saharan Africa .......................................................................... 462

Germany: Future Force Numbers ..................................................79

Country comparisons

Expenditure on Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya ... 84

Selected Training Activity 2011 ................................................... 464

Recent and Planned UK Defence Personnel,

Equipment and Estate Measures ...................................................85

International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure

and Military Manpower ................................................................. 467

Post-Main Gate Major Equipment Projects ...............................85

Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations –

Leading Recipients in 2010........................................................... 474

Breakdown of UK Defence Expenditure ....................................86

Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Europe ......... 174

Arms Transfer Agreements with Developing Nations –

Leading Recipients in 2010........................................................... 474

Russia

Russia National Defence Expenditure Trends (2000–14) ... 189

Global Arms Deliveries – Leading Suppliers

in 2010 .................................................................................................. 474

Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia .......... 204

asia

Global Arms Transfer Agreements –

Leading Suppliers in 2010 ............................................................. 474

Asia Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Top 10 and

Sub-Regional Breakdown.............................................................. 209

Value of Global Arms Transfer Agreements and

Market Share by Supplier, 2003–10 .......................................... 474

China Defence Budget Trends and Estimates (2008–10) .. 215

Indian Defence Expenditure by Function

(FY2009/10–FY2011/12) ............................................................... 218

Value of Global Arms Deliveries and Market Share

by Supplier, 2003–10 ..................................................................... 474

Japan Defence-Related Expenditures Breakdown

and Trends (2009–12) .................................................................... 223

Arms Deliveries to Middle East and North Africa,

by Supplier, 2003–10 ...................................................................... 475

Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Asia ............... 294

Non-state Groups and ailiates

Middle East and North africa

Non-State Groups and Ailiates ................................................. 478

Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure

2010–11: Top 10 and Regional Breakdown (US$bn) ........... 306

Reference

List of Abbreviations for Data Sections ................................... 495

Saudi Arabia Macroeconomic and Budgetary

Trends 2001–10 (SR bn) ................................................................. 314

Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations ............................... 498

Index of FIGUREs

1 DoD Budget Authority (Constant FY2010 $) ..............................45

2 US Defence Expenditure (Budget Authority) as % of GDP ....48

3 NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure as %

of GDP ........................................................................................................75

4 Non-NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure

as % of GDP ..............................................................................................75

5 United Kingdom Defence Budget Trends

(FY2008/09–FY2014/15) .....................................................................84

6 Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ......... 190

7 South and Central Asia Regional Defence Expenditure

as % of GDP ........................................................................................... 210

8 East Asia and Australasia Regional Defence Expenditure

as % of GDP ........................................................................................... 210

9 Asia Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Sub-Regional

Breakdown ............................................................................................ 211

Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure

2010–11: Sub-Regional Breakdown ............................................ 306

Middle East and North Africa Regional Defence

Expenditure as % of GDP ................................................................. 307

Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Defence

Expenditure as % of GDP ................................................................. 363

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Defence Expenditure

as % of GDP ........................................................................................ 419

Index of Maps

The War in Libya ...................................................................................15

4 Côte d’Ivoire ....................................................................................... 412

5 Arctic .......................................................................... Inside back cover

Afghanistan ...........................................................................................29

Japan’s Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Accident ........... 221

The Military Balance 2012

Editor’s Foreword

The Military Balance 2012 is a comprehensive and inde-

pendent assessment of the military capabilities and

defence economics of 171 territories. It is also a reference

work on developments in global military and security

afairs.

One year ago, defence analysts may have assumed a

number of issues would dominate the defence debate in

2011, including the continuing shift in the relative balance

of military power to Asia; China’s rise, and its growing

strategic reach; deepening budget woes in Western econ-

omies and the efect of this on defence planning; the ten-

year anniversary of 9/11; and a decision on a future US

presence in Iraq. The year was instead dominated by the

Arab Awakening.

The strategic landscape in the Middle East and North

Africa is being reshaped, with new questions and uncer-

tainties afecting long-held assumptions about regional

power balances, military capabilities and deterrence. The

actions of some states’ armed forces have led analysts to

conclude that they function primarily as internal secu-

rity forces. Indeed, during the past year, many Arab

militaries have at times behaved as an extension of

ruling regimes and at times as independent institutional

players focused on securing and maintaining their own

positions. In some cases, what had seemed on paper

to comprise extensive and modern combat forces were

in fact revealed to consist of relatively small cores of

favoured and well-equipped troops designed to bolster

regimes.

This strategic lux is felt acutely in Israel. Turmoil

in Israel’s immediate neighbourhood sharpens an

established focus for the country’s defence planners,

for years concerned about Iran’s developing nuclear

and ballistic-missile programmes. Within the region,

Yemen’s apparent slide into greater instability concerns

not only Yemenis and their immediate neighbours, but

also those nations whose shipping and cargo transit the

vital sea lanes south of the country, already subject to

the unwanted atentions of Somali-based pirates. As for

the Gulf states, the Arab Awakening has diverted aten-

tion from the main threat they also perceive to stability:

Tehran’s ambitions and its nuclear and ballistic-missile

programmes.

But the Arab Awakening has also seen unprec-

edented willingness by several Arab governments

to back, and participate in, military operations. Both

the UAE and Qatar deployed combat aircraft, and in

Qatar’s case special forces, on operations in Libya, and

other Arab nations deployed military forces to support

humanitarian missions. However, at least as of the end

of November 2011 there was litle appetite to repeat it

in Syria, where the Assad regime continues to force-

fully resist demonstrators’ demands. The intervention

in Bahrain in March 2011 highlighted a diferent side

to this military activity, at least in Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) states, with a willingness to use the

GCC’s Peninsula Shield force to maintain internal secu-

rity, based on the GCC charter’s section on military

cooperation. However, smaller Gulf states are wary

that the invocation of the charter to deploy into Bahrain

could serve as a precedent for Saudi intervention in their

own afairs. Sharpening focus on Iran also drives GCC

military developments: though the US maintains key

regional defence forces and facilities, and plays a central

coordinating role in elements of regional defence coop-

eration, GCC states have lately indicated a greater desire

to improve intra-GCC co ordinative mechanisms.

The US withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011

increases the salience of such developments. The US

retains key bases and substantial forces in the region, but

the failure to agree terms with Iraq meant the end of a

sustained US military presence that began with regime

change in 2003. Washington will of course retain a signif-

icant defence-related presence through the large US

Embassy, and military contracts signed with Iraq.

But for the US, the aftermath of the Iraq and

Afghanistan wars – combined with the impact of the

inancial crisis on budgets and perceptions of allied

unwillingness to help shoulder the burden – may have

implications for the nature and extent of US involve-

ment in future crises. This does not necessarily point to

retrenchment, but Washington may give more careful

thought to whether intervention in crises is necessarily

in the US interest; to the nature and duration of any mili-

tary response; and to the type of forces the US should

develop and maintain. That said, not every military

emergency will be of Washington’s choosing, so main-

taining lexible forces capable of acting in a wide range

of contingencies will also preoccupy the Pentagon. The

US nonetheless remains the only NATO member capable

ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012

of sustaining large-scale air–sea operations, and the only

one able to project ground forces larger than a handful

of brigades in out-of-area operations. While US forces

will reduce in size, the adaptability demonstrated in the

years since 9/11, and particularly since the 2003 inva-

sion of Iraq, means the smaller force will still be highly

capable. However, as former US Secretary of Defense

Robert Gates said in May 2011, ‘a smaller military, no

mater how superb, will be able to go to fewer places and

be able to do fewer things’.

The US continues to contribute the majority of forces

to the ongoing NATO mission in Afghanistan, where

a transition of full security leadership to the Afghan

authorities by 2015 is planned. The Afghan National

Army and Police continue to expand, and many inter-

national armed forces and security establishments are

supporting eforts to build the capacity of these forces,

as well as to develop institutions within the Afghan

government. The pledge by many Western govern-

ments to withdraw combat forces by 2015 makes more

pressing the widespread assumption of independent

planning, mission execution and sustainment by Afghan

security forces; it also increases the pressure on Kabul,

and its international supporters, to remedy the institu-

tional weakness in governance that has so bedevilled the

NATO campaign.

This continuing US commitment demonstrates, as

did the Libya deployment, the enduring military capa-

bility retained by the US. Washington’s decision to with-

draw for the most part from a direct combat role in an

operation in Europe’s backyard showed that, even when

it is ‘leading from behind’, the US remains the indispen-

sible member of NATO. While the Alliance was able to

manage its Libyan operation without drawing down

forces in Afghanistan, things might have changed had

the campaign lasted longer than it did. The operation also

highlighted the importance of the enabling capabilities,

such as logistics support and ISR, that the US continued to

supply after it withdrew from combat operations. Libya

also revealed signiicant shortcomings on the part of US

Alliance partners, notably shortages in will and some key

capabilities and military specialisations. Despite Gates’s

chiding over the burden the US had to shoulder in Libya,

there is litle chance this situation will improve, particu-

larly in light of Europe’s economic diiculties and their

impact on defence ambitions and resourcing. Indeed, the

desire that European states should take on more of the

defence burden for the continent is perhaps as much a

relection of Washington’s recognition of defence budget

cuts to come, and the rising importance of Asia, as of US

weariness over carrying so much of the load for so long.

Some European governments continue to explore

ways to pool and share capabilities. Defence-budget pres-

sure in most NATO and EU states has created a window

of opportunity that should, in theory, propel govern-

ments towards closer defence cooperation. But the areas

of potential cooperation hitherto identiied have for the

most part involved education, training, logistics support

and maintenance, rather than deployable front-line capa-

bilities. Such cooperation can save money while creating

the same or improved capability, but it will need to be

complemented by a coherent long-term approach that

anchors pooling and sharing in national defence plan-

ning and focuses on capabilities relevant for likely tasks.

While it might be tempting to feed into pooling and

sharing initiatives projects that otherwise would have

been deleted, this could simply lead to obsolete capabili-

ties being uploaded onto the European level.

In the short term, until signiicant cost savings can

be made via interstate cooperation or greater industrial

coordination or competition, countries have resorted

to cuting personnel and equipment programmes. For

European governments, the decision to cut military

capabilities has generally been driven by economic

considerations. There has been some reassessment of

national priorities, but litle multilateral consultation

over the scale of capability cuts. Real-terms reductions in

defence spending have, between 2008–10, occurred in at

least 16 European NATO member states and, in a signii-

cant proportion these, real-terms declines exceeded 10%.

NATO still maintains its aspiration for member states to

spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence: a igure met

in 2010 by ive states: the US, the UK, France, Turkey and

Greece.

As noted in last year’s Military Balance , there is a signif-

icant and continuing shift in relative military strength

away from the West and towards Asia, where rapid

economic growth and continuing strategic uncertainty

have meant both demand for and availability of substan-

tially increased resources for defence. Across the region,

defence spending increased by a relatively substantial

3.15% in real terms over the last year, despite rising inla-

tion. China, Japan, India, South Korea and Australia

accounted for more than 80% of the total regional spend.

China, the region’s top spender, increased its share of

regional expenditure to above 30%, while Japan and

India saw their shares of the regional total fall below 20%

and 10% respectively. Many key procurement contracts

should soon be awarded. India, Japan and South Korea

are all in the process of buying new ighters. India

continues plans to boost its maritime capabilities with

submarine acquisitions and its domestic aircraft-carrier

programme (as well as one ex-Russian carrier). Australia

has also seen maritime-capability enhancements, and

the acquisition of F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets pending

the arrival of the F-35. After a period of relative stagna-

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: