Analytical Anarchism.pdf

POLITICAL THEORY / April 2000

Carter / ANALYTICAL ANARCHISM

ANALYTICAL ANARCHISM

Some Conceptual Foundations

ALAN CARTER

University of London

I N THE 1980 S , Marxist political philosophy suffered mixed fortunes. On

one hand, it underwent a considerable demise in Eastern Europe as a state-

promoted ideology. On the other hand, it enjoyed a profound and positive

development in Western academia, principally as a result of the seminal work

of G. A. Cohen, 1 whose clarifications of key Marxist concepts and explana-

tory claims gave birth to the fecund school of analytical Marxism. Histori-

cally, Marxist political philosophy has been subjected to incessant critiques

from anarchists. However, now that Marxism has evolved into a form that can

hold its own within the anglophone tradition of analytical philosophy, anar-

chism, which at one time was the major alternative on the revolutionary Left

to Marxism, would appear to have been left well and truly behind.

But is it really the case that anarchism is incapable of enjoying a similar

intellectual development? In what follows, I attempt some clarifications of

concepts and explanations that show that there is more mileage in anarchist

political theory than might at first be assumed. Thus, such clarifications

might serve to rescue anarchist political thought and the often profound

insights it contains from an otherwise premature burial by both liberal and

Marxist academics.

Now, whereas many of Karl Marx’s theoretical claims were offered as a

response to anarchist thinkers (for example, Max Stirner and Pierre-Joseph

Proudhon), 2 some anarchists (in particular, the Russian Mikhail Alexandro-

vitch Bakunin) developed their views in opposition to Marx’s. The anarchist

theory that follows is a development in response to what is currently the most

sophisticated version of Marxist theory—Cohen’s. And just as Cohen has

developed his clarifications firmly within the tradition of analytical philoso-

phy, the following discussion is also located within that tradition. Conse-

quently, as Cohen has given us analytical Marxism, what follows could be

regarded as an exploration into “analytical anarchism.”

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 28 No. 2, April 2000 230-253

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Carter / ANALYTICAL ANARCHISM

231

First, though, how should we conceptualize “anarchism,” in the sense of a

political belief system? As “anarchy” literally means “without rule” (thus

signifying a situation in which no person rules over another), then a condition

of pure anarchy might be thought to consist of a complete equality of political

power—perfect political equality, as it were. But, many would object, if anar-

chists seek pure anarchy in this sense, then, quite simply, they are seeking the

unattainable. In any practicable social arrangement, some people are bound

to possess more power than others.

However, anarchism is not the only system of political beliefs that seems

at first sight to be incoherent insofar as its adherents appear to be striving for a

condition that is, arguably, unattainable; egalitarianism has been dismissed

on similar grounds. If egalitarians are seeking perfect equality (which, it is

often assumed, means that everyone is to be made exactly the same), then,

many would object, they are seeking the unattainable. In response, John

Baker has denied that egalitarians are seeking perfect equality in this sense.

Rather, in his view, egalitarians merely oppose certain substantive inequali-

ties. 3 And if “egalitarianism” is construed as the opposition to certain sub-

stantive inequalities, it is not so easy to dismiss.

Perhaps, then, “anarchism” should be interpreted in a similar way. Not all

anarchists should be dismissed out of hand for attempting to bring about pure

anarchy. Rather, anarchists could more profitably be viewed as those who

oppose certain substantive political inequalities and not merely economic

ones. Anarchists oppose certain inequalities in political power, just as egali-

tarians oppose certain inequalities in, especially, economic power. And the

most significant political inequalities, for anarchists, are those that flow from

centralized, authoritarian forms of government.

This suggests that “anarchism,” as a political belief system, might best be

construed as having both a normative and an empirical component. Anar-

chism could be viewed as containing a normative opposition to certain sub-

stantive political inequalities, along with the empirical belief that political

equality (in the sense of an absence of specific, substantive political inequali-

ties) is inevitably undermined by state power. Given the normative compo-

nent, anarchism can thus be regarded as a form of egalitarianism—political

egalitarianism. However, many of those who advocate representative democ-

racy would also regard themselves as political egalitarians. It is the second

feature—namely, the empirical belief (which most of those who describe

themselves as “anarchists” tend to hold) that centralized, authoritarian forms

of government (including varieties of representative democracy) cannot

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deliver political equality—that would distinguish anarchists from others who

claim to value political equality.

Thus, given the conceptualization of “anarchism” proposed here, for an

individual to be an anarchist, he or she would have to hold both the normative

opposition to certain substantive political inequalities and the empirical

belief that they principally derive from, are preserved by, or are embedded

within, certain centralized forms of power. 4 Hence, all anarchists, on the pro-

posed definition, oppose the state. But that should not be confused with an

opposition to society. Nor should it be confused with a rejection of all the

rules that a society might need—for example, moral rules. In fact, most anar-

chists are highly moral. 5 Consequently, when discussing anarchism, it is

extremely important to realize that “without rule” does not have to signify

“without rules,” nor does it have to mean a lack of structure. What is surely

crucial to any version of anarchism worth its salt is that the anarchist struc-

tures it proposes be empowering to those within them and do not lead to a

centralization of power or decision making. Even with those restrictions, the

possibilities for anarchist social organization are clearly far greater than most

opponents of anarchism realize or than is portrayed in popular stereotypes of

anarchist practice.

Having offered what might appear a more attractive and fruitful way of

conceptualizing anarchism—namely, as the opposition to certain substantive

political inequalities, combined with the belief that the state inevitably

embodies, generates, and/or preserves those inequalities—I now turn to con-

sider the central respect in which anarchist political theory and thus anarchist

political practice differ from their Marxist counterparts. This will lead us into

an analysis of the crucial relationship between the political and economic

inequalities that anarchists oppose.

Certain Marxists—in particular, Leninists—have been willing to adopt a

vanguardist approach to revolutionary change, while Marx, himself, sanc-

tioned a transitional form of governmental power—what he referred to as “the

dictatorship of the proletariat.” 6 And insofar as this would be coercive and

centralized, 7 then it would be some form of state. Anarchists have tradition-

ally most opposed Marxists on these grounds, arguing that a revolutionary

vanguard would soon turn itself into a new statelike form and further arguing

that no statelike form could be relied on to engineer an effective transition to

an egalitarian society.

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233

But this anarchist objection, if it is to be at all compelling, requires a

coherent theory of historical change. As Cohen has provided the clearest

foundations for a Marxist theory of history, I now attempt to provide similarly

clear foundations for a contrasting anarchist theory—foundations that

employ conceptual and explanatory clarifications that parallel Cohen’s.

What specific conceptual tools does a cogent anarchist theory of history

require, then, if it is to serve as the basis for a plausible political theory (espe-

cially one that can hold its own against recent developments in Marxist the-

ory)? It seems likely that anarchists must, at the very least, be in possession of

the concepts employed by the most sophisticated version of Marxism if they

are to oppose it successfully. So let me begin my attempt at providing a few of

the main components of an anarchist conceptual toolkit by appropriating

some of the important concepts that Cohen has usefully clarified.

Following Marx, Cohen distinguishes between a “superstructure” of

noneconomic institutions (in particular, legal and political institutions) and

the structure of relations of production that comprise the “base” or “founda-

tion,” in Marx’s terminology. For brevity’s sake, we can regard this as a dis-

tinction between a set of political relations and a set of economic relations.

Cohen further distinguishes between the relations of production and the

forces of production. According to Cohen, the relations of production are

best construed as relations of, or relations presupposing, effective control of

the productive forces. And it is the development of these forces of production

that explains historical transition, on Cohen’s interpretation of Marx’s theory

of history. Within the forces of production, Cohen distinguishes between the

labor-power of the producing agents and the means of production (which are

primarily tools and raw materials). What develops when the forces of produc-

tion develop, therefore, is labor-power in the form of skill and knowledge, on

one hand, and tools and machinery, on the other. For convenience, I shall refer

to this as “technological development.”

But why does Cohen define the economic structure as a set of relations of,

or presupposing, effective control of the productive forces, rather than as it is

standardly conceived—namely, as a set of ownership rights? He does so

because a common objection raised by analytical philosophers against

Marx’s theory of history is that the base cannot be effectively distinguished

from the superstructure because economic relations are legal relations, and

legal relations are superstructural. By defining economic relations in a

rechtsfrei manner, Cohen side-steps this objection.

However, construing economic relations as relations of, or presupposing,

effective control of the productive forces gives rise to the question of how

such control is enabled and preserved—a question that anyone at all sympa-

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POLITICAL THEORY / April 2000

thetic to anarchism is bound to ask. Just as Cohen argues that it is a mistake to

confuse rechtsfrei economic relations with legal ones, an anarchist is likely to

argue that it is at least as serious an error to fail to separate economic relations

when construed as relations of, or presupposing, effective control from what-

ever the ability to exercise that control rests on. Such an ability cannot just be

taken for granted. It requires power. 8 How, then, is that ability enabled and

preserved? Without doubt, partly by the coating of legality it has been

sprayed with—in other words, by a general acceptance of the legal standing

of the economic relations. But it is also enabled and preserved coercively by

agents of the state—by those actors deemed responsible for securing eco-

nomic control: namely, the police and, in the last resort, military personnel.

But these agents are not economic forces, economic relations, or legal or

political relations, although they might be situated within political relations,

just as the economic forces are situated within economic relations.

In short, Cohen distinguishes between the political and the economic, on

one hand, and between relations and forces, on the other. But, an anarchist is

compelled to object, the set of categories Cohen thereby employs within his

theory of history is incomplete. He only employs economic forces, economic

relations, and political relations. To complete the list, we would need to draw

a distinction within the political sphere that parallels the one drawn within the

economic. Let us therefore distinguish between both the political and the

economic instances and between their respective relations and forces. This

gives us four categories: political relations, economic relations, economic

forces, and political forces—the latter category containing forces of defense.

And as this new category—political forces—comprises the forces that

empower the state, it is obviously going to figure predominantly in any

cogent anarchist political theory.

So, on the basis of the discussion so far, an anarchist conceptual toolkit

would need to include at least the following: on one hand, like Cohen’s, it

would require instruments for distinguishing between relations of production

and forces of production. Thus, it requires, at the most general level, the dis-

tinction between economic relations and economic forces. The set of eco-

nomic relations, constituting the economic structure, comprises relations of,

or presupposing, effective control over production and, I would also want to

add, relations of, or presupposing, effective control over exchange. 9 Rela-

tions of production, specifically, are relations of, or presupposing, effective

control of the productive forces. And these economic forces—the forces of

production—comprise economic labor-power (that capacity that the agents

of production supply) and the means of production (for example, machinery).

On the other hand, venturing beyond Cohen’s limited set of distinctions, an

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