Bertrand, Russell - A Debate on the Argument from Contingency.pdf - Russell - asiaka88

A Debate on the Argument from Contingency

Father F. C. Copleston and Bertrand Russell

Copleston: As we are going to discuss the existence of God, it might perhaps be as

well to come to some provisional agreement as to what we understand by the term

"God." I presume that we mean a supreme personal being -- distinct from the world

and creator of the world. Would you agree -- provisionally at least -- to accept this

statement as the meaning of the term "God"?

Russell: Yes, I accept this definition.

Copleston: Well, my position is the affirmative position that such a being actually

exists, and that His existence can be proved philosophically. Perhaps you would tell

me if your position is that of agnosticism or of atheism. I mean, would you say that

the non-existence of God can be proved?

Russell: No, I should no t say that: my position is agnostic.

Copleston: Would you agree with me that the problem of God is a problem of

great importance? For example, would you agree that if God does not exist, human

beings and human history can have no other purpose than the purpose they choose

to give themselves, which -- in practice -- is likely to mean the purpose which those

impose who have the power to impose it?

Russell: Roughly speaking, yes, though I should have to place some limitation on

your last clause.

Copleston: Would you agree that if there is no God -- no absolute Being -- there

can be no absolute values? I mean, would you agree that if there is no absolute good

that the relativity of values results?

Russell: No, I think these questions are logically distinct. Take, for instance, G. E.

Moore's Principia Ethica , where he maintains that there is a distinction of good and

evil, that both of these are definite concepts. But he does not bring in the idea of God

to support that contention.

Copleston: Well, suppose we leave the question of good till later, till we come to

the moral argument, and I give first a metaphysical argument. I'd like to put the

main weight on the metaphysical argument based on Leibniz's argument from

"Contingency" and then later we might discuss the moral argument. Suppose I give

a brief statement on the metaphysical argument and that then we go on to discuss

it?

Russell: That seems to me to be a very good plan.

The Argument from Contingency

Copleston: Well, for clarity's sake, I'll divide the argument into distinct stages.

First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world

which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I

depend on my parents, and no w on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly,

the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects,

none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence. There isn't

any world distinct from the objects which form it, any more than the human race is

something apart from the members. Therefore, I should say, since objects or events

exist, and since no object of experience contains within itself reason of its existence,

this reason, the totality of objects, must have a reason external to itself. That reason

must be an existent being. Well, this being is either itself the reason for its own

existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. If it is not, then we must proceed

farther. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of

existence at all. So, I should say, in order to explain existence, we must come to a

being which contains within itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say,

which cannot not exist.

Russell: This raises a great many points and it is not altogether easy to know

where to begin, but I think that, perhaps, in answering your argument, the best

point at which to begin is the question of necessary being. The word "necessary," I

should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions. And, in fact, only

to such as are analytic -- that is to say -- such as it is self-contradictory to deny. I

could only admit a necessary being if there were a being whose existence it is self-

contradictory to deny. I should like to know whether you would accept Leibniz's

division of propositions into truths of reason and truths of fact. The former -- the

truths of reason -- being necessary.

Copleston: Well, I certainly should not subscribe to what seems to be Leibniz's

idea of truths of reason and truths of fact, since it would appear that, for him, there

are in the long run only analytic propositions. It would seem that for Leibniz truths

of fact are ultimately reducible to truths of reason. That is to say, to analytic

propositions, at least for an omniscient mind. Well, I couldn't agree with that. For

one thing it would fail to meet the requirements of the experience of freedom. I don't

want to uphold the whole philosophy of Leibniz. I have made use of his argument

from contingent to necessary being, basing the argument on the principle of

sufficient reason, simply because it seems to me a brief and clear formulation of

what is, in my opinion, the fundamental metaphysical argument for God's existence.

Russell: But, to my mind, "a necessary proposition" has got to be analytic. I don't

see what else it can mean. And analytic propositions are always complex and

logically somewhat late. "Irrational animals are animals" is an analytic proposition;

but a proposition such as "This is an animal" can never be analytic. in fact, all the

propositions that can be analytic are somewhat late in the build-up of propositions.

Copleston: Take the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a

necessary being." I consider that that proposition hypothetically expressed is a

necessary proposition. If you are going to call every necessary proposition an

analytic proposition, then -- in order to avoid a dispute in terminology -- I would

agree to call it analytic, though I don't consider it a tautological proposition. But the

proposition is a necessary proposition only on the supposition that there is a

contingent being. That there is a contingent being actually existing has to be

discovered by experience, and the proposition that there is a contingent being is

certainly not an analytic proposition, though once you know, I should maintain, that

there is a contingent being, it follows of necessity that there is a necessary being.

Russell: The difficulty of this argument is that I don't admit the idea of a

necessary being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling

other beings "contingent." These phrases don't for me have a significance except

within a logic that I reject.

Copleston: Do you mean that you reject these terms because they won't fit in with

what is called modern logic"?

Russell: Well, I can't find anything that they could mean. The word "necessary,"

it seems to me, is a useless word, except as applied to analytic propositions, not to

things.

Copleston: In the first place, what do you mean by "modern logic?" As far as I

know, there are somewhat differing systems. In the second place, not all modern

logicians surely would admit the meaninglessness of metaphysics. We both know, at

any rate, one very eminent modern thinker whose knowledge of modern logic was

profound, but who certainly did not think that metaphysics are meaningless or, in

particular, that the problem of God is meaningless. Again, even if all mo dern

logicians held that metaphysical terms are meaningless, it would not follow that they

were right. The proposition that metaphysical terms are meaningless seems to me to

be a proposition based on an assumed philosophy. The dogmatic position behind it

seems to be this: What will not go into my machine is non-existent, or it is

meaningless; it is the expression of emotion. I am simply trying to point out that

anybody who says that a particular system of modern logic is the sole criterion of

meaning is saying something that is over-dogmatic; he is dogmatically insisting that

a part of philosophy is the whole of philosophy. After all, a "contingent" being is a

being which has not in itself the complete reason for its existence that's what I mean

by a contingent being. You know, as wel I as I do, that the existence of neither of us

can be explained without reference to something or somebody outside us, our

parents, for example. A "necessary" being, on the other hand means a being that

must and cannot not exist. You may say that there is no such being, but you wil find

it hard to convince me that you do not understand the terms I am using. If you do

not understand them, then how can you be entitled to say that such a being does not

exist, if that is what you do say?

Russell: Well, there are points here that I don't propose to go into at length. I

don't maintain the meaninglessness of metaphysics in general at all. I maintain the

meaninglessness of certain particular terms -- not on any general ground, but

simply because I've not been able to see an interpretation of those particular terms.

It's not a general dogma -- it's a particular thing. But those points I will leave out for

the moment. And I will say that what you have been saying brings us back, it seems

to me, to the ontological argument that there is a being whose essence involves

existence, so that his existence is analytic. That seems to me to be impossible, and it

raises, of course, the question what one means by existence, and as to this, I think a

subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described.

And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate.

Copleston: Well, you say, I believe, that it is bad grammar, or rather bad syntax

to say for example "T. S. Eliot exists"; one ought to say, for example, "He, the

author of Murder in the Cathedral , exists." Are you going to say that the proposition,

"The cause of the world exists," is without meaning? You may say that the world

has no cause; but I fail to see how you can say that the proposition that "the cause of

the world exists" is meaningless. Put it in the form of a question: "Has the world a

cause?" or "Does a cause of the world exist?" Most people surely would understand

the question, even if they don't agree about the answer.

Russell: Well, certainly the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" is a

question that has meaning. But if you say "Yes, God is the cause of the world"

you're using God as a proper name; then "God exists" will not be a statement that

has meaning; that is the position that I'm maintaining. Because, therefore, it will

follow that it cannot be an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that exists.

For example, suppose you take as your subject "the existent round-square," it

would look like an analytic proposition that "the existent round- square exists," but

it doesn't exist.

Copleston: No, it doesn't, then surely you can't say it doesn't exist unless you have

a conception of what existence is. As to the phrase "existent round-square," I should

say that it has no meaning at all.

Russell: I quite agree. Then I should say the same thing in another context in

reference to a "necessary being."

Copleston: Well, we seem to have arrived at an impasse. To say that a necessary

being is a being that must exist and cannot not exist has for me a definite meaning.

For you it has no meaning.

Russell: WelI, we can press the point a Iittle, I think. A being that must exist and

cannot not exist, would surely, according to you, be a being whose essence involves

existence.

Copleston: Yes, a being the essence of which is to exist. But I should not be willing

to argue the existence of God simply from the idea of His essence because I don't

Bertrand, Russell - A Debate on the Argument from Contingency.pdf

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