0415130603.Routledge.Philosophy.of.Mind.A.Contemporary.Introduction.Jun.1998.pdf

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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
A contemporary introduction
John Heil
London and New York
-iii-
First published 1998
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001
Reprinted 2000
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
© 1998 John Heil
Typeset in Aldus Roman by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Heil, John.
Philosophy of mind: a contemporary introduction/John Heil.
p. cm. —(Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy; 3)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Philosophy of mind. I. Title. II. Series.
BD418.3.H47 1998
128′.2-dc21 97-32598
CIP
ISBN 0-415-13059-X (hbk)
ISBN 0-415-13060-3 (pbk)
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For Mark, Gus, and Lilian
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[This page intentionally left blank.]
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Contents
Preface and acknowledgments
ix
Chapter 1: Introduction
1
Science and metaphysics
6
A look ahead
8
Chapter 2: Descartes’s legacy
13
Cartesian dualism
16
Modifying Cartesian dualism
26
Non-Cartesian dualism
40
Taking stock
47
Suggested reading
48
Chapter 3: Varieties of materialism: Behaviorism and
psycho- physical identity
51
Behaviorism
54
The identity theory
71
Taking stock
84
Suggested reading
85
Chapter 4: Functionalism and the Representational Theory
of Mind
87
The functionalist picture
90
Elements of functionalism
95
The Representational Theory of Mind
104
The layered view of the world
114
“Qualia”
121
Suggested reading
127
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Chapter 5: Interpretational theories of mind and
eliminativism
129
Davidson and the prepositional attitudes
132
Dennett and the intentional stance
154
Eliminativism
168
Suggested reading
171
Chapter 6: Minds and their place in nature
173
Metaphysical background
176
Applying the view
197
Dénouement
219
Suggested reading
224
Bibliography
227
Index
233
-viii-
Preface and acknowledgments
One aim of this book is to introduce readers with little or no background in philosophy
to central issues in the philosophy of mind, and to do so in a way that highlights those
issues’ metaphysical dimensions. In this regard, my approach differs from those that
emphasize connections between the philosophy of mind and various empirical
domains: psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, for instance. It is not
that I regard empirical work as irrelevant to the philosophy of mind. After years of
skepticism, however, I have become convinced that the fundamental philosophical
questions concerning the mind remain metaphysical questions—where metaphysics
is understood as something more than the a priori pursuit of eternal verities:
metaphysics, as I see it, takes the sciences at their word. More particularly, the
fundamental questions are questions of ontology— our best accounting of what, in
the most general terms, there is.
Like any other systematic pursuit, ontology is constrained formally: ontological theses
must be internally coherent. Ontological theses ought, in addition, to be reconcilable
with established scientific lore. When we consider every imaginable ontology that is
consistent, both internally and with pronouncements of the sciences, however, we
can see that the field remains wide open. Something more is required if our
evaluation of competing approaches is to be anything more than a bare expression of
preference. That something more lies in the relative power of alternative schemes. An
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