Historical Study - Night Combat.pdf

(475 KB) Pobierz
*CMH Pub 104-3
*CMH Pub 104-3
NIGHT COMBAT
*This publication replaces DA Pam 20-236, June 1953.
Facsimile Edition, 1982, 1986
Center of Military History United States Army Washington, D.C.
FOREWORD
The material for this study was prepared for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a group of former German
generals and general staff officers. The principal author, former Brig. Gen. Alfred Toppe, and most of his
associates served for extended periods on the Russian Front during World War II. Moreover, most of them held
assignments involving troop training.
The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from
the German point of view, and that the procedures, tables of organization and equipment, combat doctrine, and
staff methods of the German Army differed widely from those of the U.S. Army. It is interesting to note,
however, that, in conformity with the German recommendations made in this study, our own programs are
placing increasing emphasis on night combat training.
241452262.001.png
Final editing of this study was done in the Foreign Studies Branch, Special Studies Division, Office of the
Chief of Military History. The draft translation of the original German text was first revised and then
reorganized in the interest of brevity, clarity, and pertinence. In this process every effort was made to retain the
point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the authors.
A. C. SMITH
Major General, USA
Chief, Military History
CONTENTS
Page
1
I. General
4
II. Physical and Psychological Factors
4
III. Exercise of Command
5
IV. Orientation
6
V. Reconnaissance
6
VI. Security
7
VII. Movements
7
VIII. Assembly
8
IX. Attack
9
X. Pursuit
12
XI. Defense
13
XII. Retrograde Movements
15
XIII. Position Warfare
16
I. Characteristics and Training of the Russian Soldier
19
II. Movements
20
III. Reconnaissance
21
IV. Infiltration
22
V. Offensive Operations
27
VI. Defensive Operations
29
VII. Retrograde Movements
30
VIII. Partisan Warfare
30
I. Movements
32
II. Reconnaissance
33
III. Offensive Operations
33
IV. Defensive Operations
37
V. Retrograde Movements
38
I. General
42
II. Individual Training
43
III. Weapons Training
44
IV. Unit Training
44
APPENDICES Training Schedules
46
47
48
49
v
MAPS
No.
Page
vi
23
25
35
36
40
241452262.002.png
[1]
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The reader of the prewar German Army operations manual, upon reaching the chapter heading "Night
Combat," found that the subject was covered very succinctly and somewhat superficially. The contents
failed to reveal the tremendous importance that night combat and night movements were to assume in
modern warfare.
During two world wars, night and other periods of poor visibility, such as fog and snowstorms or
rainstorms, gradually came to be considered the ideal time for action. Interference from the air reduced
fighting and paralyzed movements in daylight hours, with the result that the space between the front and
the most remote corner of the rear areas was often empty and deserted. During the hours of darkness
combat and movements resumed with new intensity. After a while the German soldier considered this
mole-like existence as normal, but the conclusions that should have been drawn from these undeniable
facts in setting up training schedules were completely inadequate.
In Russia more and more actions occurred at night. Once this was widely recognized during the later
years of the war, much of the individual and unit training took place during darkness and other periods of
poor visibility.
The farther the recruit is removed from nature, the more night training he must get. Once a soldier has
learned how to move and fight at night, he will be all the more effective in daytime when good visibility
facilitates his tasks.
The purpose of movements in darkness or obscurity is to conceal preparations and thereby achieve
maximum surprise and effect. Another important consideration is that night combat keeps the casualty
rate at a minimum. Both elements apply to any operation from the time of assembly until its conclusion,
whether it is a small unit action or a strategic envelopment.
Movement and combat at night are inexpedient when a certain minimum amount of orientation is
impossible because terrain conditions and the enemy situation are too uncertain, or when the moon or
enemy action create conditions resembling daylight.
*This publication replaces DA Pam 20-236, June 1953.
2
Bright nights make it easier to conduct night operations, but they give the enemy more opportunity to
observe and interfere.
To overcome these difficulties, units accustomed to night fighting learned to apply certain practical
lessons. Night movement and night combat require the most exacting preparation by officers and men,
including detailed map and terrain study. Even for well-trained troops, poor visibility will cause delays
that may result in a lowering of the over-all march performance or may involve loss of initiative and
freedom of action. The larger the units, the greater the difficulties that will inevitably arise.
Careless night movement along roads and on the battlefield enables the enemy to take effective
countermeasures. Depending on the enemy's potential and the ability of his leaders, the advantages
friendly forces derive from operating in darkness may not only be cancelled out, the execution of the
entire operation plan may be jeopardized by a complete stoppage of every movement, by a disruption of
the chain of command, and by panic.
Before any night operation the responsible commanders must familiarize themselves with the theater of
operations, become thoroughly acquainted with the enemy's matériel and his methods of employing
them, and observe carefully his tactics in different situations. Possessing this knowledge, a field
commander will be able to decide whether the principles of night combat should be applied rigidly or
whether there may be some relaxation.
Under conditions as they exist in central and eastern Europe, troops must be capable of carrying out night
marches in such a manner that their performance will not be greatly affected by observation and
interference from the air. Once under way, movements in the combat zone must be completed according
to schedule, even in the face of surprise enemy action. This may be achieved by breaking down units into
small components, by camouflaging them, and by applying other protective measures.
The intended operations must achieve surprise, so that the enemy is not prepared f or counteraction.
However, it must be assumed that during large-scale operations only the preparations and the initial
engagements will take place under cover of darkness. To bring the fighting to a successful conclusion
will require efficient interunit communication, a clear view of the situation and the terrain, and the
exercise of firm leadership—demands that can be met only in daylight.
Night operations require the closest contact among ground units and among all components of services
operating in a given theater.
Bombing and strafing missions against movements behind the enemy front may save lives and decide
battles; the same thing is
3
true of day and night attacks on enemy aircraft and airfields, which facilitate movements behind one's
own front and, in some instances, constitute a prerequisite for the execution of such movements without

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika:

Zgłoś jeśli naruszono regulamin