Parfit.Justifiability.pdf

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Ratio (new series) XVI 4 December 2003 0034–0006

JUSTIFIABILITY TO EACH PERSON

Derek Parﬁt

According to

Scanlon’s Formula : An act is wrong just when, and because, such

acts are disallowed by some principle that no one could rea-

sonably reject.

Though ‘reasonable’ usually means much the same as ‘rational’,

Scanlon uses this word in a different, moral sense. We are unrea-

sonable, in this sense, if we ignore, or give too little weight to,

some other people’s well-being or moral claims. 1

Some critics have suggested that, because Scanlon appeals to

this sense of ‘reasonable’, his formula is empty. On this objection,

whenever we believe that some act is wrong, we shall believe that

people have moral claims not to be treated in this way. We could

therefore argue that such acts are disallowed by some principle

which no one could reasonably reject, since anyone who rejected

this principle would be giving too little weight to people’s moral

claims not to be treated in this way. Since everyone could claim

that the principles which they accept could not be reasonably

rejected, Scanlon’s Formula would make no difference to our

moral thinking.

That is not so. If we reject the principles that disallow certain

acts, we are denying that such acts are wrong. This denial would

be unreasonable if it would give too little weight to some other

people’s moral claims. So Scanlon’s Formula implies that

(1) an act is wrong when, and because, the denial that such

acts are wrong would give too little weight to some people’s

moral claims.

1 Scanlon does not assume that, when two people disagree, at least one of these people

must be being unreasonable. There can be reasonable mistakes. But, if neither person is

being unreasonable in rejecting the other’s principle, there may be no relevant principle

that could not be reasonably rejected, with the result that Scanlon’s Formula would fail.

So, when Scanlon claims that no one could reasonably reject some principle, he should

be taken to mean that anyone who rejected this principle would be making a moral

mistake, by failing to recognize or giving too little weight to other people’s moral claims,

even if this might be a not unreasonable mistake.

JUSTIFIABILITY TO EACH PERSON

369

If we accept (1), we cannot also claim that

(2) people have moral claims not to be treated in some way,

because such acts are wrong.

People cannot have these moral claims because the denial that

such acts are wrong gives too little weight to these claims.

To illustrate this point, suppose that, in

Earthquake : You and Black are trapped in burning wreckage. We

are potential rescuers. We could save Black’s life, but only by

causing you to lose an arm.

On one view about such cases, which we can call

the Greater Burden Principle : We are permitted to impose a

burden on someone if that is our only way of saving someone

else from a much greater burden.

According to

the Means Principle : It is wrong to inﬂict great injuries on some

people as a means of saving others from greater injuries.

Scanlon makes various claims about what would be reasonable

grounds for rejecting moral principles. According to one such

claim,

it would be unreasonable ...to reject a principle because it

imposed a burden on you when every alternative principle

would impose much greater burdens on others. 2

Black might say that, as this claim implies, you could not reason-

ably reject the Greater Burden Principle. Though our following

this principle would impose a burden on you, our following the

Means Principle would impose a much greater burden on Black.

Losing an arm is much less bad than dying.

You might reply that, in your opinion, Black could not reason-

ably reject the Means Principle. But why would this rejection be

unreasonable? You might say that you have a right not to be seri-

ously injured as a means of beneﬁting someone else. But, in claim-

ing that you have this right, you would be appealing to your belief

that it would be wrong for us to injure you in this way. And on

Scanlon’s view, as we have seen, you cannot appeal to such beliefs.

According to Scanlon’s Formula,

2 ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in Moral Discourse and Practice , edited by Stephen

Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton (OUP, 1997) p. 272.

370

DEREK PARFIT

(3) if it is wrong to inﬂict such injuries, that is because the

Means Principle cannot be reasonably rejected.

If you accept (3), you cannot also claim that

(4) the Means Principle cannot be reasonably rejected because

it is wrong to inﬂict such injuries.

Combining these claims would be like pulling on your boot laces

to hold yourself in mid air. If certain acts are wrong because they

are condemned by some unrejectable principle, this principle

cannot be unrejectable because such acts are wrong.

As this example shows, if we accept Scanlon’s contractualism,

that makes some moral beliefs easier to defend, and makes others

harder to defend. When Black defends the Greater Burden

Principle, she can claim that dying is much worse than losing an

arm. This is the kind of fact to which, on Scanlon’s view, moral

reasoning can appeal. When you defend the Means Principle, you

cannot appeal to such a fact. Your problem is that, unlike the

Greater Burden Principle, the Means Principle is best defended

by appealing to our moral intuitions. When we consider cases of

this kind, most of us believe that it it is wrong to injure some

people, without their consent, as a means of beneﬁting others. If

we think about morality in Scanlon’s way, we cannot appeal to

such intuitive beliefs. According to what we can call this

moral beliefs restriction , when we apply Scanlon’s Formula, we

cannot reject moral principles by appealing to our beliefs about

which acts are wrong. 3

This feature of Scanlon’s view has wide implications. For example,

according to

Act Consequentialism : We ought to do whatever would make

things go best.

This view is best challenged by appealing to our moral intuitions.

Most of us believe that it can be wrong to act in certain

ways – such as killing, lying, or stealing – even when such acts

would make things go best. But, if we all accepted Scanlon’s

Formula, Act Consequentialists could dismiss these appeals to our

intuitions.

3 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), 4–5,

216. Simple page numbers below will refer to this book.

JUSTIFIABILITY TO EACH PERSON

371

According to

Rule Consequentialism : We ought to act on the principles whose

acceptance would make things go best.

If we accepted Scanlon’s Formula, Rule Consequentialists could

argue:

We ought to act on the principles that no one could reason-

ably reject. No one could reasonably reject any of the princi-

ples whose acceptance would make things go best.

Therefore

These are the principles on which we ought to act.

Scanlon believes that both forms of consequentialism are mis-

taken. Partly for this reason, he imposes another restriction on

grounds for rejecting moral principles. According to what we can

call Scanlon’s

anti-consequentialist restriction : We cannot reasonably reject some

principle by appealing to claims about the goodness of

outcomes.

Such claims, Scanlon writes, ‘do not provide, in themselves,

reason for rejecting principles.’ 4 If we cannot reject principles by

appealing to such claims, consequentialism is undermined.

According to

Act Utilitarianism : We ought to do whatever would beneﬁt

people most.

This view need not make claims about the goodness of outcomes.

If Act Utilitarians make no such claims, their view is not under-

mined by Scanlon’s anti-consequentialist restriction. And, if we

accepted Scanlon’s Formula, these people could dismiss the

strongest objections to their view. As Scanlon writes,

the implications of act utilitarianism are wildly at variance with

ﬁrmly held moral convictions. 5

On Scanlon’s account of moral reasoning, we cannot reject a

moral view by appealing to such convictions.

222.

‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, 267.

372

DEREK PARFIT

According to

Rule Utilitarianism : We ought to act on the principles whose

acceptance would beneﬁt people most.

As before, this view need not make claims about the goodness of

outcomes. And, if we accepted Scanlon’s Formula, Rule Utilitari-

ans could argue:

We ought to act on the principles that no one could reason-

ably reject. No one could reasonably reject any of the princi-

ples whose acceptance would beneﬁt people most.

Therefore

These are the principles on which we ought to act.

Scanlon believes that both forms of utilitarianism are mistaken.

Partly for this reason, he adds a further claim about grounds for

reasonable rejection. According to what we can call Scanlon’s

Individualist Restriction : In rejecting some moral principle, we

must appeal to this principle’s implications only for ourselves,

or for any other single person.

In Scanlon’s words:

the justiﬁability of a moral principle depends only on individ-

uals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and alternatives to

it. 6

This restriction undermines the argument just given. Even if some

principle is one of those whose acceptance would beneﬁt people

most, there may be people who could reasonably reject this prin-

ciple. These people may have personal reasons to reject this prin-

ciple which are stronger than anyone’s reasons to reject some

alternative.

Scanlon makes several claims about personal reasons for reject-

ing principles. The strength of these reasons depends in part, as

we have seen, on how great the burdens are that some principle’s

acceptance would impose on us. But it may also depend on

certain other facts, such as how badly off we are, or whether we

would be responsible for the burdens that would be imposed on

us. Some reasons for rejecting principles, Scanlon adds, have

229.

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