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Speech and Writing according to Hegel
Speech and writing according to Hegel
Jacques Derrida (1971)
Source: G W F Hegel, Critical Assessments , edited by Robert Stern, Routledge 1993
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Introduction to Hegel's semiology
Since real difference belongs to the extremes, this mean ( Mitte ) is but an abstract neutrality, their real
possibility, the as it were theoretical element of the existence, process, and results of chemical objects. In
the corporeal element water has this function of being medium; in the spiritual element, in so far as there
is an analogon of such a relationship in it, we must seek this function on the side of signs in general, and
more precisely ( nääher ) in language. [ Science of Logic , p729]
What must be understood here by 'mean'? By 'semiological medium'? And more precisely (nääher) -
more closely, more narrowly - by 'linguistic medium'? We shall here be interested in the difference of this
narrowing, discovering on the way nothing else than a narrowing of difference: another name for the medium
of the spirit.
In the Encyclopaedia (§§ 458) Hegel regrets that in general 'signs and language are introduced as an
appendix in psychology, or even in logic, without any reflection on their necessity and their enchainment in
the system of the activity of the understanding'.
For the moment let us see here the indication or the incitation to recognise that the essential place of
semiology is at the centre, not on the margin or as an appendix to Logic.
In determining Being as presence (presence of the present being [é étantpréésent ] in the form of an
object, or self-presence of the present being in the form of self-consciousness), metaphysics could only
consider the sign as a passage, a place of passage, a passage-way [ passerelle ] between two moments of
presence, the provisional reference from one presence to the other. The passage-way can be lifted. The sign
procedure, the process of signification, has a history; it is history comprehended: comprehended between
a primordial presence and its reappropriation in a final presence, in the self-presence that would have been
separated from itself only during the time of a detour, the time of the sign. The time of the sign is then the
time of reference; and time itself is but the referring of presence to itself. As such signification, the sign
procedure is, to be sure, the moment of presence lost; but it is a presence lost by the very time that engages
it in the movement of its reappropriation.
The sign can then, in metaphysics, become an object - the object of a theory. That is it can be
considered, regarded on the basis of what is given to be seen in intuition, viz. the present being. The theory
of signs arises from present being, but also, and thereby, in view of the present being, in view of presence.
The 'in view' designates the theoretical pre-eminence of the gaze, as well as the authority of the final aim,
the telos of reappropriation of full presence, the ordination of the theory of signs to the light of parousia. The
theory of signs, already inasmuch as it is a theory, though it be given out to be scientific or positive, is, from
this point of view, metaphysical in essence; it is historically metaphysical inasmuch as the concept, and
consequently the whole theory, of signs remains commanded by an archaeology, an eschatology and a
teleology ordained to presence, or to presentation of present being.
It could be shown that this very general necessity governs metaphysics in its essence and in its totality -
which is one with its history, and, I would even go so far as to say: with history as such.
Speech and Writing According to Hegel / Derrida
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We should then expect Hegelianism, which is so generally said to represent the completion of
metaphysics, both in the sense of accomplishment and in the sense of end, to give the most systematic and
powerful, the most ingathered, ingathering, assembled, assembling form to this metaphysical gesture. We
should find a primary index of this in an architectonic reading that aims to locate the place Hegel assigns
to the theory of signs in the system. For such an architectonic reading it would doubtless be best to consult
here the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (1817).
I Semiology and psychology
The theory of signs is inscribed in the third part of the Encyclopaedia, that is in the Philosophy of Mind,
following the Science of Logic ( Lesser Logic ) and the Philosophy of Nature. What does this division answer
to? To briefly collect its meaning it is enough that we refer to what Hegel himself says at the end of the
Introduction to the Encyclopaedia , §§ 18:
As the whole science, and only the whole, can exhibit what the Idea or system of reason is, it is
impossible to give in a preliminary way ( vorlaufige Yorstellung: precursorily) a general impression of a
philosophy. Nor can a division ( Einstellung: distribution) of philosophy into its parts be intelligible, except in
connection with the system. A preliminary division, like the limited conception from which it comes, can only
be an anticipation (something anticipated). Here, however, it is premised that the Idea turns out to be ( sich
erweist ) the thought which is completely ( schlechthin: simply) identical with itself, and not identical simply
in the abstract, but also in its action of setting itself over against itself, so as to gain a being of its own, and
yet a being in full possession of itself while it is in this other ( und in diesem Anderen nur bei sich selbst zu
sein ). Thus philosophy is subdivided in three parts:
1. Logic, the science of the Idea in and for itself.
2. The Philosophy of Nature, the science of the Idea in its otherness.
[Nature is thus the Idea inasmuch as it has left itself and opposed itself to itself.]
3. The Philosophy of Mind, the science of the Idea come back to itself out of that otherness.
All this is, of course, a movement, and Hegel makes clear that this kind of dividing would be abusive if
it decomposed and juxtaposed these three parts, substantialising their differences.
The theory of signs belongs, then, to the third part, the Philosophy of Mind, the science of that moment
in which the Idea returns to itself after having so to speak lost consciousness, lost the consciousness and
meaning of itself in nature. The sign would then be a moment or an essential structure of the Idea's return
to self-presence, returning to itself in Mind. Mind is the Idea's being with itself. We can then already assign
to signs the absolutely general determination of being a form or a movement of the Idea's relation to itself
in Mind, a mode of the absolute's being with itself.
Let us narrow our focus, and situate with more precision the theory of signs within the Philosophy of
Mind. The Philosophy of Mind is itself articulated into three parts, corresponding to the three movements of
the development of Mind:
The Mind Subjective: the self-relation, and the ideal totality of the Idea. Being with itself in inward
freedom.
The Mind Objective: in the form of a world to be produced and to be produced no longer in the
form of ideality, but of reality. Freedom now becomes existent, present necessity ( vorhandene
Notwendigkeit ).
Speech and Writing According to Hegel / Derrida
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The Mind Absolute: the existent unity of Mind as objectivity and of
Mind as ideality and concept, which essentially and actually is in and for itself and for ever reproduces
itself: Mind in its absolute truth.
The first two moments are finite and transitory determinations of Mind. The theory of signs belongs to
the science of one of these finite determinations, that of the Mind Subjective. If we consider that ‘‘the finite
is not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition ( Ubergehen ) and an emergence to something higher
( Ubersichhinausgehen )’’, then we can determine signs - which are part of a finite determination of Mind -
to be a mode or finite determination of Mind Subjective taken as mediation or self-surpassing; the sign is
a transition within transition, a transition of transition. But it is the transition of the departure from itself that
is the route unto itself ( nosto ). This transition is, of course, thought in the movement of the true, under the
authority of the dialectic, and is supervised (so to speak) by the concepts of Aufhebung and negativity. 'This
finitude ... is the dialectic that makes a thing have its cessation (Ver gehen ) by and in another.'
But let us state yet more precisely the site of Hegel's semiology. The Mind Subjective itself is
In itself, or immediate: this is the soul or the Spirit in nature ( Naturgeist ), the object of
Anthropology, which in fact studies man in nature.
For itself, or mediate, as identical reflection in itself and in other things. This is Mind in relation
or particularization ( Besonderung ): consciousness the object treated by Phenomenology of Mind.
Mind determining itself in itself, as a subject for itself. This is the object treated by Psychology.
The theory of signs belongs precisely to psychology, defined as the science of Mind determining itself
in itself as a subject for itself. Let us in passing notice (though this is most significant) that semiology, as a
part of the science of the subject for itself, does not thereby belong to the science of consciousness, i.e. to
phenomenology. I point out how profoundly traditional is this gesture or this topic inscribing semiology in a
non-'natural' science of the soul, a psychology. We are thereby not only referred to all the semiological
endeavours of the eighteenth century, which are all psychologies, but finally to Aristotle, the patron Hegel
invokes for his Philosophy of Mind when, in the Introduction, he writes, speaking of psychology:
The books of Aristotle On the Soul ( Peri Psychis ) ... are for this reason still by far the most admirable,
perhaps even the sole, work of speculative value on this topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can
only be to reintroduce the concept into the knowledge of mind, and so rediscover the lesson of those
Aristotelian books.
But Aristotle is precisely he who has inscribed his theory of the voice in a treatise Peri Psychis (this will
be important for us later), and in his Peri Hermeneias has defined signs, symbols, speech and writing on the
basis of the pathemata tes psychis - states, affections or passions of the soul. You know well that text that
opens the Peri Hermeneias :
Spoken words ( ta en tiphoni ) are the symbols of the affections of the soul, and written words are the
symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech
sounds, but the states of the soul, of which these expressions are the immediate signs ( semeia protos: the
primary signs) are the same for all [which precisely permits making a science of them], as also are those
things of which these states are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about
the soul.
When I say that it is traditional to make semiology dependent on psychology, I do not think only of
Hegelianism in the past, but also of what often gives itself out as being beyond Hegelianism, and even as
a Hegelianism surpassed. For this tradition, properly metaphysical and thus extending from Aristotle to
Speech and Writing According to Hegel / Derrida
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Hegel, will not be interrupted by the venerable (venerated) initiator of the modern project of the general
semiology that serves as the paradigm or model for so many 'modern' and 'human' 'sciences'. You know that
at least twice in his Course in General Linguistics de Saussure makes his plan for a general semiology
juridically dependent on psychology.
Everything in language is basically psychological, including its material and mechanical manifestations,
such as sound changes; and since linguistics provides social psychology with such valuable data, is it not
part and parcel of this discipline? (p. 6-7) A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable;
it would be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology (from
Greek semeion 'sign'). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the
science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked
out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology; the laws discovered by
semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass
of anthropological facts.
To determine the exact place of semiology is the task of the psychologist.
It is from our point of view noteworthy that it was the same linguist or glossematician, Hjelmslev, who,
while recognising the importance of the Saussurian heritage, cast into question, as the uncritical
presuppositions of the Saussurian science, at the same time the authority recognised to psychology and the
privilege accorded to the sonorous or phonic 'expressive substance'. We shall see how the psychic
excellence and the phonic pre-eminence go together in Hegel also, for reasons that are essential and are
historically metaphysical.
We return to Hegel: what does the inscription of semiology in speculative psychology mean for him? It
means first very generally that signs are here considered according to the structure and movement of the
Aufhebung by which mind, rising above nature, suppressing and retaining it, sublimating it in itself, is
accomplished as inward freedom, and thus is presented to itself as such: 'Psychology', says Hegel, 'studies
the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental - intuition, representation, remembering etc.,
desires etc.' As in the De Anima (432 ab) Hegel in several place refuses every real separation between the
faculties of the soul (cf. §§ 445). In view of this attention to not substantially separate the psychic faculties
and structures, but rather to determine their mediations, articulations, joinings, which constitute the unity of
the movement, it is noteworthy that the theory of signs, essentially consisting in a theory of speech and
writing, is contained in two long Remarks, much longer than the paragraphs to which they are attached, in
the sub-chapter entitled 'Imagination'. Semiology is then a development in the theory of imagination, and
more precisely, as we will see, in a Phantasiology or Phantastics.
What is imagination? Representation ( Vorstellung ) is intuition remembered-interiorised ( erinnerte ). It
pertains to intelligence ( Intelligenz ), which consists in interiorising sensible immediacy, 'to posit itself as
possessing the intuition of itself' ( in sich seibst anschauend zu setzen ) - to lift and conserve, in the twofold
movement of Aufhebung, the subjectivity belonging to inferiority, to be exteriorised in itself and 'be in itself
in its own exteriority' ( in ihrer eigenen Ausserlichkeit in sich zu sein ) . Erinnerung is a decisive moment or
movement in this movement of representation by which intelligence is recalled to itself, and is in itself in its
own exteriority. In it the content of intuition becomes an image - that is, is freed from immediacy and
individuality so as to allow transition to objective conceptual representation. And the image that thus is
erinnert interiorised in memory - is no longer an 'existence', that is present, there, but stored up out of
consciousness ( bewusstlos aufbewahrt ), retained in an unconscious abode. Intelligence can then be
conceived as this reserve, this very dark cover at the bottom of which the buried images are to be sought.
It is, Hegel says, a 'nocturnal pit' ( näächtliche Schacht ) or, further, an unconscious pit ( bewusstlose
Schacht ).
We shall now follow in the Hegelian text the route that goes from this pit of night, silent as death but also
reverberant as all the powers of voice it holds in reserve - the route that from this pit of night which is also
Speech and Writing According to Hegel / Derrida
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a pit of voice and truth leads us to a certain pyramid brought back from Egyptian deserts which will soon rise
on the sober and abstract fabric of the Hegelian text to fix there the stature and status of the sign. That the
route here is circular and that the pit is a pyramid is the enigma about which we must ask if it is to be brought
up like a truth from the bottom of the pit or deciphered as an inscription on the front of the monument.
The intelligence that is in possession of this reservoir ( Vorrat ), this pit, can then draw from it and bring
to light, produce, 'exteriorise its possession (Eigentum) without having any further need of exterior intuition
for it to exist'. 'This synthesis of the internal image with the recollected existence is representation proper:
by this synthesis the internal now has the qualification of being able to be presented (to be held) before
intelligence and have its existence, its Dasein, in it' (§§ 454).
This movement is the movement of the reproductive imagination ( reproduktive Einbildungskraft ). The
'source' of images is here 'the inferiority belonging to the ego, which is now the power over them'. Having
thus this reserve of images at its disposal, intelligence, operating by subsumption, is reproduced in itself,
recalled, interiorised ( erinnert ), and is thereby produced as fancy, symbolizing, allegorizing or poetising
( dichtende ) imagination. But if there is here only question of the re-productive imagination, this is because
all these formations, these Gebilde, remain syntheses working over intuitive, receptive data, passively
received from the exterior, met with, found ( gefundene ) , given ( gegebene ) in intuition. This imagination, this
Einbildungskraft, then does not produce, does not form, does not imagine its own Gebilde .
But - seemingly paradoxically - inasmuch as this imaginative re-production is not a production, inasmuch
as it receives the content of what it forms, inasmuch as it does not produce sponte sua an existence or a
thing, it still remains shut up within itself. The self-identity of intelligence has been recovered, but in
subjective unilaterality. The seeming paradox is then due to the fact that intelligence remains subjective,
internal, because it has to passively receive a gefundene, a given met with an intuition. It is still an affection.
This moment will be lifted in productive imagination, productive fancy, where the intuition of self, the
immediate relation with oneself, such as it was given in re-productive imagination, becomes an existent, is
exteriorised, is produced in the world as an existent or a thing. This thing is the sign. And this movement is
the movement of productive fancy, the sign-making fancy ( Zeichen machende Phantasie ). Imagination forms
signs in, as always, proceeding outside of itself.
I shall translate §§ 457, which brings us from reproduction without signs to the production of signs:
In fancy intelligence is accomplished ( vollendet )in view of intuition of itself ( zur Selbstanschauung )
inasmuch as the content gathered in itself has an imaged existence ( Existenz ). But this formation of the
intuition of itself is subjective; it still lacks the moment of being. But in this unity of internal content and matter
( Stoffes ), intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical self-relation and to immediacy. As
reason, its first start was to appropriate to itself ( anzueignen ) the immediate datum in itself, i.e. to
universalise it; and now its action as reason is from the present point directed towards giving the character
of an existent ( als seiendes zu bestimmen ) to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. In
other words, it aims at making itself be ( Sein ) and be a thing ( Sache ). Acting on this view, it is
selfexteriorizing ( ist sie sich ääussernd), intuition-producing ( Anschauung produzierend ): the imagination
which creates signs ( Zeichen machende Phantasie ).
Let us first notice that the production most creative of signs is here determined as a simple
exteriorisation, that is fundamentally as expression, setting without of what is within, with all that can
command the classic nature of this concept. Let us notice, second, that this sign-producing imagination
nevertheless does nothing less than produce intuitions - an affirmation that may appear abusive or
unintelligible, since here it is a creating of what is given to be seen. Imagination here has a site or a status
analogous to Kant's transcendental imagination, which also, as an 'art hidden in the depths of the soul', is
an intermediary schema between the sensibility and the understanding, and comprises their respective and
contradictory predicates, receptive passivity and productive spontaneity. Finally let us notice that the

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