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360 BC

STATESMAN

by Plato

translated by Benjamin Jowett

STATESMAN

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: THEODORUS; SOCRATES; THE ELEATIC STRANGER;

THE YOUNGER SOCRATES

Socrates. I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the

acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.

Theodorus. And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three

times as many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the

Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.

Soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my

ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the

great calculator and geometrician?

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they

are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can

express.

Theod. By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair

hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will

retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the

Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed

either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he

prefers.

Stranger. That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and

not leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?

Theod. In what respect?

Str. Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young

Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise?

Theod. Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young

always do better when they have intervals of rest.

Soc. I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in

some way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of

my ugly face, the other is called by my name. And we should always

be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his

conversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday,

and I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have

not yet examined, but I must. Another time will, do for me; to-day let

him answer you.

Str. Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder

Socrates is proposing?

Young Socrates. I do.

Str. And do you agree to his proposal?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist,

then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order

of enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among

those who have science.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Then the sciences must be divided as before?

Y. Soc. I dare say.

Str. But yet the division will not be the same?

Y. Soc. How then?

Str. They will be divided at some other point.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find

and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set the mark

of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive

of ail kinds of knowledge under two classes.

Y. Soc. To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine.

Str. Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be yours

as well as mine.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts,

merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the

knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but

he also makes things which previously did not exist.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are

practical and those which are-purely intellectual.

Y. Soc. Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is one

whole.

Str. And are "statesman," "king," "master," or "householder," one

and the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of

these names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.

Y. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. If any one who is in a private station has the skill to

advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a

physician?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise

the ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which

the ruler himself ought to have?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But, surely the science of a true king is royal science?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he

happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in

reference to his art, be truly called "royal"?

Y. Soc. He certainly ought to be.

Str. And the householder and master are the same?

Y. Soc. Of course.

Str. Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:-will

they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?

Y. Soc. They will not.

Str. Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing,

do we not clearly see that there is one science of all of them; and

this science may be called either royal or political or economical; we

will not quarrel with any one about the name.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his

hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his

empire, compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of

his mind.

Y. Soc. Clearly not.

Str. Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to

knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?

Y. Soc. Certainly he has.

Str. Then we may put all together as one and the

same-statesmanship and the statesman-the kingly science and the king.

Y. Soc. Clearly.

Str. And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to

divide the sphere of knowledge?

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.

Y. Soc. Tell me of what sort.

Str. Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of

calculation?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Which was, unmistakably, one of the arts of knowledge?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences

of numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass

judgment on their differences?

Y. Soc. How could we?

Str. You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but

is the ruler of workmen?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical

science?

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his

functions as at and when he has formed a judgment;-he must assign to

the individual workmen their appropriate task until they have

completed the work.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the

like, subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between

the two classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only,

and the other of ruling as well?

Y. Soc. That is evident.

Str. May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there

are there are two divisions-one which rules, and the other which

judges?

Y. Soc. I should think so.

Str. And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be

of one mind is surely a desirable thing?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind

about the fancies of others?

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the

king?-Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him

the art of command-for he is a ruler?

Y. Soc. The latter, clearly.

Str. Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the

art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction

similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the

king from the herald.

Y. Soc. How is this?

Str. Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the

productions of others, which have been sold before?

Y. Soc. Certainly he does.

Str. And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive

orders, and in his turn give them to others?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with

the art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet,

and the numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the

preceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for

themselves, and of retailers,-seeing, too, that the class of supreme

rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost nameless-shall we make a

word following the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or

ruling-for-self science, leaving the rest to receive a name from

some one else? For we are seeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not

concerned with him who is not a ruler.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the

man who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now

let us see if the supreme power allows of any further division.

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the

division.

Y. Soc. At what point?

Str. May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of

producing something?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced

into two classes.

Y. Soc. How would you divide them?

Str. Of the whole class some have life and some are without life.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we

please, a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.

Y. Soc. At what point?

Str. One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the

other of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one

half, and take up the other; which may also be divided into two.

Y. Soc. Which of the two halves do you men?

Str. Of course that which exercises command about animals. For,

surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a

science presiding over lifeless objects;-the king has a nobler

function, which is the management and control of living beings.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed

to be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a

common care of creatures in flocks?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But the statesman is not a tender of individuals-not like the

driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared

with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.

Y. Soc. Yes, I see, thanks to you.

Str. Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the

art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?

Y. Soc. No matter;-Whichever suggests itself to us in the course

of conversation.

Str. Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too

particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when

you are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the

name, -can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of

herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst

twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that

number?

Y. Soc. I will try;-there appears to me to be one management of

men and another of beasts.

Str. You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and

manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think

that we had better avoid.

Y. Soc. What is the error?

Str. I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion

which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should

be a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is

a most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you

were under the impression that you were right, because you saw that

you would come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you

should not chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is

to cut through the middle; which is also the more likely way of

finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the

difference in a process of enquiry.

Y. Soc. What do you mean, Stranger?

Str. I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good

parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain

myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little

clearer.

Y. Soc. What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in

our recent division?

Str. The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the

human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in

this part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species,

and all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and

have no ties or common language, they include under the single name of

"barbarians," and because they have one name they are supposed to be

of one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to

cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species,

comprehending the first under another separate name, you might say

that here too was a single class, because you had given it a single

name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and

logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and

even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and

female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other

tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you

could no longer make a division into parts which were also classes.

Y. Soc. Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part

and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.

Str. O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very

difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original

intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further

away. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there

is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time

I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare-

Y. Soc. What?

Str. That a class and a part are distinct.

Y. Soc. What did I hear, then?

Str. That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar

necessity that a part should be a dass; that is the view which I

should always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.

Y. Soc. So be it.

Str. There is another thing which I should like to know.

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the

exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management

of herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that them

were two species of animals; man being one, and all brutes making up

the other.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. I thought that in taking away a part you imagined that the

remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the

common name of brutes.

Y. Soc. That again is true.

Str. Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise

and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in

imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes

against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the

same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the

appellation of brutes,-here would be the sort of error which we must

try to avoid.

Y. Soc. How can we be safe?

Str. If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be

less likely to fall into that error.

Y. Soc. We had better not take the whole?

Str. Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.

Y. Soc. How?

Str. You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was

concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living

creatures,-I mean, with animals in herds?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. In that case, there was already implied a division of all

animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called

tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.

Y. Soc. True.

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