Plato - Gorgias.pdf

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380 BC
GORGIAS
by Plato
translated by Benjamin Jowett
GORGIAS
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: CALLICLES; SOCRATES; CHAEREPHON; GORGIAS;
POLUS
Scene: The house of Callicles.
Callicles. The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray,
but not for a feast.
Socrates. And are we late for a feast?
Cal. Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been
exhibiting to us many fine things.
Soc. It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to
blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
Chaerephon. Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have
been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine,
and I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you
prefer, at some other time.
Cal. What is the matter, Chaerephon-does Socrates want to hear
Gorgias?
Chaer. Yes, that was our intention in coming.
Cal. Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and
he shall exhibit to you.
Soc. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I
want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is
which he professes and teaches; he may, as you [Chaerephon] suggest,
defer the exhibition to some other time.
Cal. There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to
answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only
just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him,
and that he would answer.
Soc. How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon-?
Chaer. What shall I ask him?
Soc. Ask him who he is.
Chaer. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been
a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?
Chaer. I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our
friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any
questions which you are asked?
Gorgias. Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just
now; and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has
asked me a new one.
Chaer. Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.
Gor. Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
Polus. Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make
trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long
time, is tired.
Chaer. And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than
Gorgias?
Pol. What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
Chaer. Not at all:-and you shall answer if you like.
Pol. Ask:-
Chaer. My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his
brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the
name which is given to his brother?
Pol. Certainly.
Chaer. Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
Pol. Yes.
Chaer. And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon,
or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
Pol. Clearly, a painter.
Chaer. But now what shall we call him-what is the art in which he is
skilled.
Pol. O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are
experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience
makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience
according to chance, and different persons in different ways are
proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts.
And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he
is a proficient is the noblest.
Soc. Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias;
but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.
Gor. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he
was asked.
Gor. Then why not ask him yourself?
Soc. But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer:
for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has
attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.
Pol. What makes you say so, Socrates?
Soc. Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art
which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some
one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
Pol. Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
Soc. Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody
asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and
by what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you
briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at
first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias:
Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question what
are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?
Gor. Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
Soc. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
Gor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that
which, in Homeric language, "I boast myself to be."
Soc. I should wish to do so.
Gor. Then pray do.
Soc. And are we to say that you are able to make other men
rhetoricians?
Gor. Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at
Athens, but in all places.
Soc. And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias,
as we are at present doing and reserve for another occasion the longer
mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise,
and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
Gor. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will
do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my
profession is that I can be as short as any one.
Soc. That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method
now, and the longer one at some other time.
Gor. Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never
heard a man use fewer words.
Soc. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker
of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I
might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would
you not?), with the making of garments?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
Gor. It is.
Soc. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your
answers.
Gor. Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.
Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about
rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?
Gor. With discourse.
Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias?-such discourse as would
teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?
Gor. No.
Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And to understand that about which they speak?
Gor. Of course.
Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now
mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?
Gor. Just so.
Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the
good or evil condition of the body?
Gor. Very true.
Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:-all of them
treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally
have to do.
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of
discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not
call them arts of rhetoric?
Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only
to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there
is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect
only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified
in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.
Soc. I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say
I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:-you would
allow that there are arts?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. As to the arts generally, they are for the most part
concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in
painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in
silence; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not
come within the province of rhetoric.
Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.
Soc. But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium
of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for
example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of
playing draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly
co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is
greater-they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power:
and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter
sort?
Gor. Exactly.
Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of
these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used
was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through
the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious
might say, "And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric." But I do
not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than
geometry would be so called by you.
Gor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my
meaning.
Soc. Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:-seeing
that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of
words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what
is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:-Suppose
that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning
just now; he might say, "Socrates, what is arithmetic?" and I should
reply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those
arts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to
ask: "Words about what?" and I should reply, Words about and even
numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again:
"What is the art of calculation?" I should say, That also is one of
the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said,
"Concerned with what?" I should say, like the clerks in the
assembly, "as aforesaid" of arithmetic, but with a difference, the
difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the
quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations
to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say
that astronomy is only word-he would ask, "Words about what,
Socrates?" and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the
motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.
Gor. You would be quite right, Socrates.
Soc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about
rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those
arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium
of words?
Gor. True.
Soc. Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do
the words which rhetoric uses relate?
Gor. To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
Soc. That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for
which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you
have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the
singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next,
thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honesty obtained.
Gor. Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the
author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the
trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the
physician will say: "O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my
art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his." And
when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, "I am a physician." What do
you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest
good? "Certainly," he will answer, "for is not health the greatest
good? What greater good can men have, Socrates?" And after him the
trainer will come and say, "I too, Socrates, shall be greatly
surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show
of mine." To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and
what is your business? "I am a trainer," he will reply, "and my
business is to make men beautiful and strong in body." When I have
done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I
expect, utterly despise them all. "Consider Socrates," he will say,
"whether Gorgias or any one-else can produce any greater good than
wealth." Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of
wealth? "Yes," he replies. And who are you? "A money-maker." And do
you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? "Of course,"
will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias
contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then
he will be sure to go on and ask, "What good? Let Gorgias answer." Now
I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you
by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest
good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.
Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that
which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals
the power of ruling over others in their several states.
Soc. And what would you consider this to be?
Gor. What is there greater than the word which persuades the
judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the
citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?-if you
have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your
slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you
talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you
who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.
Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained
what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I
am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion,
having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.
Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of
producing persuasion?
Gor. No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for
persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
Soc. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever
was a man who-entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love
of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of
you.
Gor. What is coming, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you: I am very well aware that do not know what,
according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of
that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric;
although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am
going to ask-what is this power of persuasion which is given by
rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask
instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the
argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth
the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking
this further question: If I asked, "What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?"
and you said, "The painter of figures," should I not be right in
asking, What kind of figures, and where do you find them?"
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. And the reason for asking this second question would be, that
there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
Gor. True.
Soc. But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them,
then you would have answered very well?
Gor. Quite so.
Soc. Now I was it to know about rhetoric in the same way;-is
rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have
the same effect? I mean to say-Does he who teaches anything persuade
men of that which he teaches or not?
Gor. He persuades, Socrates,-there can be no mistake about that.
Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now
speaking:-do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the
properties of number?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. And therefore persuade us of them?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of
persuasion?
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about
what,-we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd
and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of
which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of
what sort, and about what.
Gor. Very true.
Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
Gor. True.
Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but
that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question
has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric
the artificer, and about what?-is not that a fair way of putting the
question?
Gor. I think so.

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