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James "Doc" Crabtree
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Contents
Guerrilla Air Defense:
Antiaircraft Weapons and Techniques for Guerrilla Forces
by James "Doc" Crabtree
Copyright © 1996 by James "Doc" Crabtree
ISBN 0-87364-880-3
Printed in thc United States of America
Chapter 1
AirThreat
1
Chapter 2
Passive Air Defense
19
Chapter 3
Active Air Defense
31
Chapter 4
Flak Traps
45
Chapter 5
Dedicated Antiaircraft Weapons... 57
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Guerrilla Air Defense
Chapter 6
Improvised Antiaircraft
Weapons
77
Appendix A
Problems of Antiaircraft
Gunnery
91
Appendix B
Problems of Missile Gunnery
95
Appendix C
A Selected Chronology of
Guerrilla Improvised
Air Defense
99
Warning
The Information in this book is presented for his-
torical reference and academic study only. The author,
publisher, and distributors of this book disclaim any
liability and assume no responsibility for the use or
misuse of the Information herein.
VI
vii
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Chapter 1
The Air Threat
In the 20th Century, air power has come to play
important roles in warfare. Air transport, intercep-
tion, reconnaissance, and Strategie taombing are just
a few of the missions carried out by aircraft. Of prima-
ry concern to the guerrilla are the roles of counterin-
surgency (COIN) and close air support (CAS).
The British pioneered the practice of using aircraft
against guerrillas following World War I. Using aircraft,
they were able to police up their huge colonial empire
against the threat of native uprisings in the Middle
East. Bombing and strafing natives far from the cities
and forts effectively crushed their resistance.
In recent years, helicopters, tacticaljets, and even
some propeller aircraft have been employed to fight
insurgents. In South West Africa and Angola, South
Guerrilla Air Defense
The Air Threat
African helicopters and paratroop aircraft were used
in concert to fight South West African People's
Organization (SWAPO) insurgents. In Argentina, the
government employed specially designed twin-turbo-
prop Pucara COIN aircraft against guerrillas. And, of
course, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'
(USSR's) war in Afghanistan led to the massive use of
attack helicopters and close air support jets to attack
Mujihadeen guerrillas in a variety of ways, using
rockets, bombs, air-dropped mines, and helicopter
assault troops.
The lesson for the guerrilla is clear: air power must
be recognized as a factor in the struggle. The govern-
ment against which the insurgency is struggling will
have the advantage of comparatively vast resources at
its disposal, including army aviation and air force
assets. And even small numbers of aircraft can have a
great impact on the struggle. Let's look at how aircraft
are employed against the guerrilla.
Aircraft can be used to locate insurgents, either
through high-altitude reconnaissance or low-level
observation. There is little the guerrilla can do about
high-altitude spy aircraft and, in fact, it is often wise
to leave low-altitude scouts alone as well. Unless the
scout aircraft can be brought down with certainty, all
the guerrilla will be doing is giving away his position.
Passive air defense measures are the best means of
protecting insurgent forces against scout aircraft.
Many countries now use remotely piloted vehicles
(RPVs)—sometimes called unmanned aerial vehicles,
or UAVs—to conduct battlefield reconnaissance.
These radio-controlled aircraft are easily recognized—
they are small and often similar in appearance to
large remote-controlled model planes. Most are prop
fixed-wing modeis, although some modeis have jet
engines or are rotary-winged in design.
RPVs can be used to fly patterns over a suspect area.
A sure sign that an RPV has spotted something is a
break in its flight pattern in response to the Controllers
desire to get a better look at something. Television cam-
eras relay real time images back to the RPV Controller,
giving him a picture of the battlefield without exposing
him to danger. The RPVs small size makes it difficult to
hit and, once again, firing at them only serves to draw
unwanted attention to guerrilla positions.
Some airborne scouts do pose a direct threat, how-
ever. RPVs or small scouting aircraft might be
employed as forward air Controllers (FACs) that call in
artillery fire or strike aircraft to hit insurgent positions.
They usually operate with enemy ground forces to pro-
vide direct support. These aircraft orbit above the bat-
tlefield, making wide circles or racetrack patterns, but
they are known to break the pattern and mark targets
from the air using smoke or flares. If FACs foolishly
stick to a set pattern, it is easier to engage them.
Infiltration is another purpose for which govern-
ment or invasion forces use air power in counterin-
surgency operations. Aircraft are used to insert
scouts to look for guerrillas on the ground far from
areas under enemy control and with a minimum
Chance of detection. These operations are often per-
formed at night when regular military forces will have
the advantage of night Vision devices.
The enemy may use air assault, in which heliborne
troops are quickly inserted into an area of operations
by rappelling from the helicopter or using "fast
ropes," which are Special sleeved ropes soldiers can
grip and slide down. If conditions at the landing zone
permit, the helicopters may opt to land and discharge
their troops, or the enemy may mount an airborne
Operation. This is the insertion of paratroopers—
either overtly or covertly—into the area of operations.
There are many missions such troops could perform.
And finally, there is the direct attack against insur-
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