Clausewitz - On War.pdf - Strategia - materiały po ang - kyclawok

ON WAR

by: Carl von Clausewitz

INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL

EDITION

TRANSLATED BY COLONEL J.J. GRAHAM {1874 was 1st edition of this translation. 1909 was the

London reprinting.} NEW AND REVISED EDITION WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

COLONEL F.N. MAUDE C.B. (LATE R.E.) EIGHTH IMPRESSION IN THREE VOLUMES

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME 1

THE Germans interpret their new national colours--black, red, and white-by the saying, "Durch Nacht

und Blut zur licht." ("Through night and blood to light"), and no work yet written conveys to the thinker

a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical

analysis of "War" by Clausewitz.

It reveals "War," stripped of all accessories, as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political

object, unrestrained by any law save that of expediency, and thus gives the key to the interpretation

of German political aims, past, present, and future, which is unconditionally necessary for every

student of the modern conditions of Europe. Step by step, every event since Waterloo follows with

logical consistency from the teachings of Napoleon, formulated for the first time, some twenty years

afterwards, by this remarkable thinker.

What Darwin accomplished for Biology generally Clausewitz did for the Life -History of Nations nearly

half a century before him, for both have proved the existence of the same law in each case, viz.,

"The survival of the fittest"--the "fittest," as Huxley long since pointed out, not being necessarily

synonymous with the ethically "best." Neither of these thinkers was concerned with the ethics of the

struggle which each studied so exhaustively, but to both men the phase or condition presented itself

neither as moral nor immoral, any more than are famine, disease, or other natural phenomena, but

as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms which can only be mastered by

understanding its nature. It is in that spirit that, one after the other, all the Nations of the Continent,

taught by such drastic lessons as Koniggr<a:>tz and Sedan, have accepted the lesson, with the

result that to-day Europe is an armed camp, and peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces,

and will continue just as lo ng as this equilibrium exists, and no longer.

Whether this state of equilibrium is in itself a good or desirable thing may be open to argument. I

have discussed it at length in my "War and the World's Life"; but I venture to suggest that to no one

would a renewal of the era of warfare be a change for the better, as far as existing humanity is

concerned. Meanwhile, however, with every year that elapses the forces at present in equilibrium are

changing in magnitude--the pressure of populations which have to be fed is rising, and an explosion

along the line of least resistance is, sooner or later, inevitable.

As I read the teaching of the recent Hague Conference, no responsible Government on the

Continent is anxious to form in themselves that line of least resistance; they know only too well what

War would mean; and we alone, absolutely unconscious of the trend of the dominant thought of

Europe, are pulling down the dam which may at any moment let in on us the flood of invasion.

Now no responsible man in Europe, perhaps least of all in Germany, thanks us for this voluntary

destruction of our defences, for all who are of any importance would very much rather end their days

in peace than incur the burden of responsibility which War would entail. But they realise that the

gradual dissemination of the principles taught by Clausewitz has created a condition of molecular

tension in the minds of the Nations they govern analogous to the "critical temperature of water

heated above boiling-point under pressure," which may at any moment bring about an explosion

which they will be powerless to control.

The case is identical with that of an ordinary steam boiler, delivering so and so many pounds of

steam to its engines as long as the envelope can contain the pressure; but let a breach in its

continuity arise--relieving the boiling water of all restraint--and in a moment the whole mass flashes

into vapour, developing a power no work of man can oppose.

The ultimate consequences of defeat no man can foretell. The only way to avert them is to ensure

victory; and, again following out the principles of Clausewitz, victory can only be ensured by the

creation in peace of an organisation which will bring every available man, horse, and gun (or ship

and gun, if the war be on the sea) in the shortest possible time, and with the utmost possible

momentum, upon the decisive field of action-- which in turn leads to the final doctrine formulated by

Von der Goltz in excuse for the action of the late President Kruger in 1899:

"The Statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready, and seeing War inevitable, hesitates to

strike first is guilty of a crime against his country."

It is because this sequence of cause and effect is absolutely unknown to our Members of Parliament,

elected by popular representation, that all our efforts to ensure a lasting peace by securing efficiency

with economy in our National Defences have been rendered nugatory.

This estimate of the influence of Clausewitz's sentiments on contemporary thought in Continental

Europe may appear exaggerated to those who have not familiarised themselves with M. Gustav de

Bon's exposition of the laws governing the formation and conduct of crowds I do not wish for one

minute to be understood as asserting that Clausewitz has been conscientiously studied and

understood in any Army, not even in the Prussian, but his work has been the ultimate foundation on

which every drill regulation in Europe, except our own, has been reared. It is this ceaseless repetition

of his fundamental ideas to which one-half of the male population of every Continental Nation has

been subjected for two to three years of their lives, which has tuned their minds to vibrate in harmony

with his precepts, and those who know and appreciate this fact at its true value have only to strike

the necessary chords in order to evoke a response sufficient to overpower any other ethical

conception which those who have not organised their forces beforehand can appeal to.

The recent set-back experienced by the Socialists in Germany is an illustration of my position. The

Socialist leaders of that country are far behind the responsible Governors in their knowledge of the

management of crowds. The latter had long before (in 1893, in fact) made their arrangements to

prevent the spread of Socialistic propaganda beyond certain useful limits. As long as the Socialists

only threatened capital they were not seriously interfered with, for the Government knew quite well

that the undisputed sway of the employer was not for the ultimate good of the State. The standard of

comfort must not be pitched too low if men are to he ready to die for their country. But the moment

the Socialists began to interfere seriously with the discipline of the Army the word went round, and

the Socialists lost heavily at the polls.

If this power of predetermined reaction to acquired ideas can be evoked successfully in a matter of

internal interest only, in which the "obvious interest" of the vast majority of the population is so clearly

on the side of the Socialist, it must be evident how enormously greater it will prove when set in

motion against an external enemy, where the "obvious interest" of the people is, from the very nature

of things, as manifestly on the side of the Government; and the Statesman who failed to take into

account the force of the "resultant thought wave" of a crowd of some seven million men, all trained to

respond to their ruler's call, would be guilty of treachery as grave as one who failed to strike when he

knew the Army to be ready for immediate action.

As already pointed out, it is to the spread of Clausewitz's ideas that the present state of more or less

immediate readiness for war of all European Armies is due, and since the organisation of these

forces is uniform this "more or less" of readiness exists in precise proportion to the sense of duty

which animates the several Armies. Where the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice is low the troops are

unready and inefficient; where, as in Prussia, these qualities, by the training of a whole century, have

become instinctive, troops really are ready to the last button, and might be poured down upon any

one of her neighbours with such rapidity that the very first collision must suffice to ensure ultimate

success--a success by no means certain if the enemy, whoever he may be, is allowed breathing -time

in which to set his house in order.

An example will make this clearer. In 1887 Germany was on the very verge of War with France and

Russia. At that moment her superior efficiency, the consequence of this inborn sense of duty--surely

one of the highest qualities of humanity--was so great that it is more than probable that less than six

weeks would have sufficed to bring the Frenc h to their knees. Indeed, after the first fortnight it would

have been possible to begin transferring troops from the Rhine to the Niemen; and the same case

may arise again. But if France and Russia had been allowed even ten days' warning the German

plan would have been completely defeated. France alone might then have claimed all the efforts that

Germany could have put forth to defeat her.

Yet there are politicians in England so grossly ignorant of the German reading of the Napoleonic

lessons that they expect that Nation to sacrifice the enormous advantage they have prepared by a

whole century of self- sacrifice and practical patriotism by an appeal to a Court of Arbitration, and the

further delays which must arise by going through the medieaeval formalities of recalling

Ambassadors and exchanging ultimatums.

Most of our present-day politicians have made their money in business--a "form of human

competition greatly resembling War," to paraphrase Clausewitz. Did they, when in the throes of such

competition, send formal notice to their rivals of their plans to get the better of them in commerce?

Did Mr. Carnegie, the arch- priest of Peace at any price, when he built up the Steel Trust, notify his

competitors when and how he proposed to strike the blows which successively made him master of

millions? Surely the Directors of a Great Nation may consider the interests of their shareholders--i.e.,

the people they govern--as sufficiently serious not to be endangered by the deliberate sacrifice of the

preponderant position of readiness which generations of self-devotion, patriotism and wise

forethought have won for them?

As regards the strictly military side of this work, though the recent researches of the French General

Staff into the records and documents of the Napoleonic period have shown conclusively that

Clausewitz had never grasped the essential point of the Great Emperor's strategic method, yet it is

admitted that he has completely fathomed the spirit which gave life to the form; and

notwithstandingthe variations in application which have resulted from the progress of invention in

every field of national activity (not in the technical improvements in armament alone), this spirit still

remains the essential factor in the whole matter. Indeed, if anything, modern appliances have

intensified its importance, for though, with equal armaments on both sides, the form of battles must

always remain the same, the facility and certainty of combination which better methods of

communicating orders and intelligence have conferred upon the Commanders has rendered the

control of great masses immeasurably more certain than it was in the past.

Men kill each other at greater distances, it is true -- but killing is a constant factor in all battles. The

difference between "now and then" lies in this, that, thanks to the enormous increase in range (the

essential feature in modern armaments), it is possible to concentrate by surprise, on any chosen

spot, a man-killing power fully twentyfold greater than was conceivable in the days of Waterloo; and

whereas in Napoleon's time this concentration of man-killing power (which in his hands took the form

of the great case-shot attack) depended almost entirely on the shape and condition of the ground,

which might or might not be favourable, nowadays such concentration of fire-power is almost

independent of the country altogether.

Thus, at Waterloo, Napoleon was compelled to wait till the ground became firm enough for his guns

to gallop over; nowadays every gun at his disposal, and five times tha t number had he possessed

them, might have opened on any point in the British position he had selected, as soon as it became

light enough to see.

Or, to take a more modern instance, viz., the battle of St. Privat-Gravelotte, August 18, 1870, where

the Germans were able to concentrate on both wings batteries of two hundred guns and upwards, it

would have been practically impossible, owing to the section of the slopes of the French position, to

carry out the old-fashioned case-shot attack at all. Nowadays there would be no difficulty in turning

on the fire of two thousand guns on any point of the position, and switching this fire up and down the

line like water from a fire-engine hose, if the occasion demanded such concentration.

But these alterations in method make no difference in the truth of the picture of War which

Clausewitz presents, with which every soldier, and above all every Leader, should be saturated.

Death, wounds, suffering, and privation remain the same, whatever the weapons employed, and

their reaction on the ultimate nature of man is the same now as in the struggle a century ago. It is

this reaction that the Great Commander has to understand and prepare himself to control; and the

task becomes ever greater as, fortunately for humanity, the opportunities for gathering experience

become more rare.

In the end, and with every improvement in science, the result depends more and more on the

character of the Leader and his power of resisting "the sensuous impressions of the battlefield."

Finally, for those who would fit themselves in advance for such responsibility, I know of no more

inspiring advice than that given by Krishna to Arjuna ages ago, when the latter trembled before the

awful responsibility of launching his Army against the hosts of the Pandav's:

This Life within all living things, my Prince, Hides beyond harm. Scorn thou to suffer, then, For that

which cannot suffer. Do thy part! Be mindful of thy name, and tremble not. Nought better can betide

a martial soul Than lawful war. Happy the warrior To whom comes joy of battle.... . . . But if thou

shunn'st This honourable field --a Kshittriya-- If, knowing thy duty and thy task, thou bidd'st Duty and

task go by--that shall be sin! And those to come shall speak thee infamy From age to age. But

infamy is worse For men of noble blood to bear than death! . . . . . . Therefore arise, thou Son of

Kunti! Brace Thine arm for conflict; nerve thy heart to meet, As things alike to thee, pleasure or pain,

Profit or ruin, victory or defeat. So minded, gird thee to the fight, for so Thou shalt not sin! COL. F. N.

MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

IT will naturally excite surprise that a preface by a female hand should accompany a work on such a

subject as the present. For my friends no explanation of the circumstance is required; but I hope by a

simple relation of the cause to clear myself of the appearance of presumption in the eyes also of

those to whom I am not known.

The work to which these lines serve as a preface occupied almost entirely the last twelve years of

the life of my inexpressibly beloved husband, who has unfortunately been torn too soon from myself

and his country. To complete it was his most earnest desire; but it was not his intention that it should

be published during his life; and if I tried to persuade him to alter that intention, he often answered,

half in jest, but also, perhaps, half in a foreboding of early death: "Thou shalt publish it." These words

(which in those happy days often drew tears from me, little as I was inclined to attach a serious

meaning to them) make it now, in the opinion of my friends, a duty incumbent on me to introduce the

posthumous works of my beloved husband, with a few prefatory lines from myself; and although here

may be a difference of opinion on this point, still I am sure there will be no mistake as to the feeling

which has prompted me to overcome the timidity which makes any such appearance, even in a

subordinate part, so difficult for a woman.

It will be understood, as a matter of course, that I cannot have the most remote intention of

considering myself as the real editress of a work which is far above the scope of my capacity: I only

stand at its side as an affectionate companion on its entrance into the world. This position I may well

claim, as a similar one was allowed me during its formation and progress. Those who are acquainted

with our happy married life, and know how we shared everything with each other--not only joy and

sorrow, but also every occupation, every interest of daily life--will understand that my beloved

husband could not be occupied on a work of this kind without its being known to me. Therefore, no

one can like me bear testimony to the zeal, to the love with which he laboured on it, to the hopes

which he bound up with it, as well as the manner and time of its elaboration. His richly gifted mind

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