MooreExternalWorld.pdf

GEORGEEDWARD MOORE

PHILO$OPHIGAII

PAPERS

COLLIER BOOKS

NEW YORK, N.Y.

Chopter 7

Proof of an Extemal World / 127

The words 'it . . . remains a scandal to philosophy . . .

that we are unable . . ." would, taken strictly, imply that, at

the moment at which he wrote them, Kant himself was

unable to produce a satisfactory proof of the point in question.

But I think it is unquestionable that Kant himself did not

think that he personally was at the time unable to produce

such a proof. On the contrary, in the immediately preceding

sentence,he has declared th4! he has, in the second edition

of his Critique, to which he-ls now writing the Preface, given

a 'tigorous proof" of this very thing; and has added that he

believesthis proof of his to be "the only possibleproof." It

is true that in this preceding sentence he does not describe

the proof which he has given as a proof of "the existence of

things outside of us" or of "the existenceof the things outside

of us," but describesit instead as a proof of "the objective

reality of orrter infuition." But the context leaves no doubt

that he is using these two phrases, "the objective reality of

outer intuition" and "the exislenccof things (or'the things')

outside of us," in such a way that whatever is a proof of the

first is also necessarily a proof of the second. We must, there

fore, suppose that when he speaksas rt we are unable to give

a satisfactory proof, he does not mean to say that he himself'

as well as others, is at the moment unable; but rather that'

until he discovered the proof which he has given, both he

himself and everybody else were unable. Of course, if he is

right in thinking that he has grven a safisfactory proof, tho

state of things which he describes came to an end as soon as

his proof was publishgd. As soon as that hapBened, anyotre

who read it was able to give a satisfactory proof by simply

repeating that which Kant had grven, and the 'scandal' to

philosophy had been removed once for all.

If, therefore, it were certain that the proof of the point in

question given by Kant in the second edition is a satisfactory

proof, it would be certain that at least one satisfactory proof

can be given; and all that would remain of the question which

I said I proposed to discuss would be, firstln the question as

to what sort of a proof this of Kanfs is, and secondly the

question whether (contrary to Kant's own opinion) there may

not perhaps be other proofg of the same or of a different

sort,-whicl are also satisfactory. lg1 t think it is by no means

certain that Kant's proof is satisfactory. I rhink it is by no

means certain that he did succeed in removing once for all

the state of affairs which he considered to be a scandal to

philosophy. .A.adI ftink, therefore, that the question whether

Proof of qn Ex?ernqf World

Pure Reason some words o""ur,;il-i-.d iri professor Kemp

to the second edition of Kant,s Critique ol

Smith's translation, are rendered'u, toiio*.,

r B xxxix, note: Kemo Sgrith, n._11:The German words are ..so

Dasein der

Dinge ausser uns. . . blossauf Gl"ub;;;;;"t_"J

",, miissen, und

wenn es jemand einfiillt es,zu bezweifef",

inm t"il-." genugtuenden

Beweis entgegenstellen

zu kcinnen-"

t26

IN rns eREFAcE

bleibtesimmer ein Sliandaloiir-t4*"ni";:':':";das

128 / Philosophical PaPers

Proofof an ExternalWorld / 129

scendental sense,"by calling them outrighl things which aie

to be met with in space."

plants of aU sorts, stones,mountains, the sun, the moon, stars,

and planets, housesand other buildings, manufactured articles

of all sorts-chairs, tables, pieces of paper, etc., are all of

them "things which are to be met with in space." In short,

all things of the sort that philosophers have been used to call

"physical objects," "material thingsr" or "bodies" obviously

come under this head. But the phrase "things that are to be

met with in space" can be naturally understood as applying

also in caseswhere the names. "physical object," "miterial

thing," or "body" can hardly be applied.For instance,shadows

naturally understood as synonymous with '\ryhatever can be

met with in space," 6ad rhis is an expression which can quite

properly be understood to include shadows. I wish the phrase

"things which are to bc md with in space" to be undirstood

in this wide sense; so that if a proof can be found that there

ever have been as rnany as two diffcrent shadows it will

follow at once that there have been at least two "things which

were to be met with in space," and this proof will be as good

a proof of the point in question as would be a proof that there

have been at least two "physical objects" of no matter what

sort.

The phrase "things which are to be met with in space"can,

therefore, be naturally understood as having a very wide

think, seryeto make still clearer what sort of things it is with

regard to which I wish to ask what proof, if any, can be given

that there are such things.

The other phrase which Kant usesas if it were equivalent

180 ,/ PhilosophicalPapers

to "things which are to be met with in space" is used by him

in the sentenge immsdialsly preceding that previously quoted

in which he declaresthat the expression "things outside of us"

"carries with it an unavoidableambiguity" (A 373).In this

preceding sentence he says that an "empirical object" "is

called external, if it is presented (vorgestellt) in space." He

treats, therefore, the phrase "presented in space" as if it

were equivalent to "to be met with in space." But it is easy

to find examples ef "things," of which it can hardly be denied

that they are "presented in space," but of which it could,

quite naturally, be emphatically denied that they are "to be

met with in space." Consider, for instance, the following

description of one set of circumstances under which what

some psychologists have called a "negative after-image" and

others a "negative after+ensation" can be obtained. "If, after

leoking steadfasflyat a white patch on a black ground, the

eye be turned to a white ground, a grey patch is seen for

somelittle time." (Foster's Text-book ol Physiology,rv, iii, 3,

Proof of an Erternal World / l8l

expressedby saying that the latter were not "to be met with

in space." And one reason why this is so is, I think' plain. To

say that so and so was at a given time "to be met with in

space" naturally suggeststhat there are conditions such that

any one who fulfillgd them might, conceivably, have "per-

ceived" the "thid$" in question-might have seen it, if it was

a visible object, have felt it, if it was a tangible one, have

heard it, if it was a sound, have smelt it, if it was a smell.

When I say that the white four-pointed paper star, at which

I looked steadfastly,was a "physical object" and was "to be

met with in space,"I am implying tha! anyone,who had been

in the room at the time, and who had normal eyesight and a

normal senseof touch, might have seenand felt it. But, in the

caseof those grey after-imageswhich I saw, it is not con-

ceivablethat any one besides myself should haveseenany one

of them. It is, of course, quite conceivable that other people,

if they had been in the room with me at the time, and had

carried out the srme experiment which I carried out would

have seen grey after-images very like one of those which I

saw: there is no absurdity in supposingeven that they might

have seen after-images exactly like on of those which I saw.

But there is an absurdity in supposing that any one of the

after-inages which I saw could also have been seen by any-

one else: in supposing that two difierent people can ever see

the very same aftevimage. One reason, then, why we should

say that none of those grey after-images which I saw was "to

be met with in space," although each of them was certainly

"presented in space" to me, is simply that none of them could

conceivably have been seen by anyone else. It is hatural so to

understand the phrase "to be met with in space," that to say

of anything which a man perceived that it was to be met with

in spaceis to say that it might have beenperceivedby others

as well as by the man in question.

Negative after-images of the kind described are, therefore,

one exrQnpleof "things" which, thougb they must be allowed

to be "plesented in space," are nevertheless rro, "to be met

with in space," and are not "external to our minds" in the

sense with which we shall be concerned. And two other im-

portant examples may be given.

The frst is this. It is well known that people sometimessee

things double, an occurrence which has also been described

by psychologistsby saying that they have a "doublc image,"

or two "images," of some object at which they are looking.

In such casesit would certainly be quite natural to say that

time-I not only saw a grey patch, but I saw it oz the white

ground, and also this grey patch was of roughly the same

shape as the white four-pointed star at which I had "looked

steadfastly" just before-it also was a four-pointed star. I

repeated this simple experiment successfully several times.

Now each of those grey four-pointed stars, one of which I

saw in each experiment, was what is called an "after-image"

or "after+e[sation"; and can anybody deny that each of these

after-images can be quite properly said to have been "pre-

sented in space"?I saw each of them on a real white back- ,

ground, and, if so,-each of them was "presented" on a real

white background. But though they were "presented in space"

everybody, I ffiink, would feel that it was gravely misleading

to say that they were "to bp met with in space." The white

star at which I "looked sieadfastly," the black ground on

which I saw it, and the white ground on which I saw the

after-images,were, of course, "to be met with in space": they

were, in fact, "physical objects" or surfacesof physical objects.

But one important difierencebetweenthem, on the one hand,

and the grey after-images, on the other, san be quite naturally

182 / Philosophlcal PaPerg

Proof of an External World' / l3g

pains, double images, and negative after-imagesof the sort I

described are so. If you look at an electric light and then

closeyour eyes,it sometimeshappensthat you see,fol some

little tilie, against the dark background which you usually see

when your eyes are shut, a bright patch similar in shape to

the light at which you have just been looking. Such a bright

patch, if you see one, is another example of what some psy-

chologistshave called "after-images" and others "after-sensa-

tions"; but, rnli1" the negativeafter-images of which I spoke

'before, it is seenwhen your eyesare shut. Of such an after-

image, seenwith closedeyes,some philosophersmight be in-

clined to say that this image too was "presentedin space,"al-

though it is certainly not "to be met with in space." They

would be inclined to say that it is "presentedin space," be-

cause it certainly is presented as at some little distance from

the person who is seeing it: and how can a thing be presented

as'at some little distancefrom me, without being "presented

in space?" Yet there is an imFortant difference between such

after-images,seen with closed eyes, and after-images of the

sort I previously dEscribed---a difterence which might lead

other philosophers to deny that these after-images, seen with

closed eyes, are "presented in space" at all. It is a difierence

whish can be expressed by saying that when your eyes are

shuf you are not seeing any part of physical space at all<f

the space which is referred to when we talk of "things which

are to be met with in space." An after-image seen with closed

eyescertainly is presented in a space,but it may be questioned

whether it is proper to say that it is preoented ia space.

It is clear, tlen, I rhink, that by no means everything which

can naturally be said to be "presentedin space" can also be

naturally said to !6 "a thing which is t9 be met with in space."

Some of the 'things," which are presented in space, are very

emphatically not to be met with in spacei or, to use another

. pbrase, which may be used to convey the same notion, they

\re emphaticLfly not "physical realities" at all. The concep-

tion "presentetl in space" is therefore, in one respect, much

wider than the conception "to be met with in space"; many

"things" fall under the first conception which do not fall un-

der the second-many after-images,one at least of the pair

of "images" seen whenever anyone sees double, and most

bodily pains, alc "presented in space," though none of them

are to be met with in space. From the fact that a "thing" is

presented in space, it by no means follows that it is to be met

with in space.But just as the frst conception is, in one tespect,

ttr1

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