summary.doc

STRENGTH
124,000
COMBAT AIRCRAFT
Tu-22M 'Backfire', Tu-95 'Bear', Tu-160 'Blackjack', MiG-29 'Fulcrum', MiG-31 'Foxhound', Su-27 'Flanker', Su-30 'Flanker', Su-35 'Flanker', Su-24 'Fencer', Su-25 'Frogfoot', Su-34 'Fullback'
COMBAT HELICOPTER
Mi-24 'Hind', Mi-28 'Havoc', Ka-50 'Hokum'
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING / COMMAND POST
A-50 'Mainstay', Il-22 'Coot', Il-87 'Maxdome'
TRANSPORT
An-12 'Cub', An-22 'Cock', An-24 'Coke', An-26 'Curl', An-32 'Cline', An-72 'Coaler', An-124 'Condor', Il-76 'Candid'
TANKER-TRANSPORT
Il-78 'Midas'

Assessment            TOP

The levels of efficiency and combat readiness of the Russian Military Air Forces (Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily - VVS) are broadly similar to those of the armed forces as a whole, as are the problems and challenges that it faces. The air force suffers from low esprit de corps among the pilots, conservatism and lack of institutional learning when it comes to assessing combat experience and institutional interest in preserving traditional Cold War strategic posture and operational missions. At the same time, the pilots alone cannot take all responsibility for the degradation of what used to be a world-class air force. Severe budgetary constraints imposed by the treasury and years of funding mismanagement by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and General Staff officials have resulted in chronic shortages of fuel and spare parts, decay of air traffic control systems and a lack of Precision-Guided Weapons. In the 1990s, pilot training hours were reduced to a bare minimum, increasing the instances of fatal pilot errors and pushing up accident rates. The situation with regard to flying hours has improved somewhat since 2003, with many pilots in particular now accumulating over 80 hours per year, up from 20 as late as 2007. Some fighter and bomber pilots, however, are still flying less than 40 hours per year. Despite incremental pay rises, a substantial number of trained pilots leave the force each year.

Former Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov appeared determined to go ahead with radical military reform, but did not seem to have a detailed plan of how to modernise the service. Indeed, until recently, strategy was mainly focused on down-sizing the force to satisfy stringent budgetary restrictions. The headquarters of five armies, 12 divisions and 70 regiments disbanded; many airfields were closed and there were also significant reductions in the number of training schools and institutions. Staff levels dropped from 318,000 in 1998 to 180,000 in 2005, including 40,000 redundancies, and declined still further, to around 124,000 by 2010 under the aegis of Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. These cuts have been justified only in so far as they have allowed the military to dispense with assets it neither needed nor could afford to keep. However, the High Command's assertion that down-sizing has increased combat readiness is not to be trusted: large or small, the VVS simply does not possess the combat and reconnaissance assets needed for low-intensity conflict; there is an acute shortage of precision guided weapons (PGWs), as well as an almost complete lack of modern fire control and damage assessment systems.

However, after years of neglect driven by economic concerns, renewed investment in the future of the VVS is underway with the planned procurement of more than 200 new combat aircraft, attack helicopters, trainers and transports by 2015. The most potent instance of long-overdue new equipment is the Sukhoi Su-34 'Fullback' strike/attack aircraft, of which some 58 examples are currently expected to enter the inventory, with other new hardware including the Mil Mi-28N 'Havoc' attack helicopter, Yakovlev Yak-130 trainer and Ilyushin Il-112 transport. Nevertheless, the 2008-09 economic crisis has forced a slow-down in procurement.

Combined Frontal Aviation and Air Defence Force            TOP

Following the merger of the Russian Air Force and the Air Defence Force, combined VVS/AD armies were created, these being tasked with combat support of ground troops, aerial reconnaissance (including artillery- and missile-fire target designation) and achievement of air superiority. Low levels of funding and lack of new equipment and munitions have seriously hit tactical aviation units in recent years. Strike capabilities have been in steady decline, as the force relies heavily on the third-generation Su-24M 'Fencer' tactical bomber, a platform that cannot be used to engage point targets and is too old and expensive to upgrade to a multi-purpose striker. Delivery of the Su-34 'Fullback' strike/attack aircraft offers the prospect of improvement, if worthwhile quantities can be acquired. Procurement of almost 60 is planned to occur by 2015, but the current financial climate may well result in curtailment at worst or delay in deployment at best.

The air defence system has changed significantly in the last few years. The lower radar limits were raised in certain areas, thus creating loopholes. The radar ceiling is kept sufficiently low only over key individual facilities and Moscow while blanket air defence missile protection of the Russian frontiers is not provided. There is a Joint Air Defence System (JADS) comprising Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, although it is unclear whether it provides a useful addition to the missile tracking system operated by the Russian Air Force. Indeed, some have argued that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) JADS only exists on paper and is merely an international agreement allowing Russia to retain some of the former Soviet air defence assets that remain in the CIS area.

Long-Range Aviation Command (formerly 37th Air Army)            TOP

Strategic capabilities have declined significantly since the mid-1990s, although the 37th Air Army has recently demonstrated on a number of occasions that it can deploy outside Russia by flying strategic bombers - including examples of the Tu-22M 'Backfire', Tu-95 'Bear' and even the Tu-160 'Blackjack' - close to NATO frontiers to test the response time of the alliance's air defence systems. However, it will take more than this fully to restore once-potent strategic capabilities. In fact, the emphasis has been shifting towards conventional bombing missions in low-intensity conflicts. In general, therefore, Long-Range Aviation seems to be better prepared for combat support of troops engaged in asymmetrical warfare; its fourth-generation bomber, the Tu-22M3 'Backfire', could be used as an attack aircraft with precision-guided weapons and is capable of operating in all-weather/night-time conditions. It was deployed in Chechnya to perform complex missions, augmenting those undertaken by the outdated Su-24 'Fencer'.

Strategic resources comprise one regiment with about 16 Tu-160s, plus at least 60 examples of each of the Tu-95 and Tu-22M. The primary strike platform is the propeller-driven Tu-95M, which is armed with the Kh-55/AS-15 'Kent' 200kt Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). While all long-range aircraft operated by the Long-Range Aviation Command are nuclear-capable, a new conventional ALCM system - the Kh-101 - is currently being developed.

In 2000, the bomber fleet was reinforced with three Tu-95s, eight Tu-160s and over 1,500 Kh-55/AS-15 'Kent' ALCMs transferred from Ukraine. For the future, the Tu-160 fleet is being modernised and, in 2007, the deputy commander Major General Anatoly Zhikharev of the then 37th Air Army confirmed that plans were under way for a wholly new bomber to succeed 'Blackjack', with funds earmarked for the research and development stage within the federal budget and a projected roll-out within a decade. The design is expected to feature some stealth capability, be able to operate from short or rough runways and employ both conventional and nuclear armament, further underlining Long-Range Aviation's new role as either a nuclear or theatre bombing force.

Short-Term Prospects            TOP

The Russian Air Force is facing at least four key challenges. First, it has to find ways to compensate for its inability to project air power beyond Russia's frontiers. This could be done by strengthening strategic and tactical components, but is not made easy by the continuing decline of its aviation assets.

Second, the VVS will soon have to start replacing its ageing fleet of Su-24s, which cannot be upgraded, as well as the Su-25 'Frogfoot' ground attack aircraft. The first examples of an upgraded version of the Su-25 - the Su-25SM - were delivered at the end of 2006, after combat-testing in Chechnya. This model is compatible with Kh-25 laser-guided air-to-surface missiles and is fitted with a laser rangefinder and night vision equipment. However, only 10 upgraded aircraft could be confirmed in service as at late 2010.

Replacement of the Su-24 is expected to proceed, albeit not at a rapid pace and certainly not on a one-for-one basis. Acquisition of the Su-34 'Fullback' is under way, with current planning anticipating equipment of a single regiment with 24 aircraft by the end of 2010, with at least another 34 examples to follow by 2015. However, delivery of the first 24 aircraft was yet to be confirmed as at early 2011. To help bridge the gap, the VVS has to begin the process of converting some fighters into multi-purpose aircraft. The MoD has floated the idea of adapting between 150 and 180 MiG-29s into multi-purpose night-time capable strike aircraft that could perform interceptor and reconnaissance missions as well as deliver guided air-to-surface munitions.

Last, but not least, the VVS must develop and procure a range of modern air-to-surface guided missiles and PGMs. Over 95 per cent of air-delivered ordnance used in Chechnya was unguided - a clear indication that the stock of these weapons is low. Russia is also lagging in the area of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) development.

However, the crash of a MiG-29 in December 2008 led to the entire 'Fulcrum' fleet being grounded for several weeks and raised questions about their long-term viability, with suggestions that up to 70 per cent of Russia's MiG-29s might be close to inoperable. The cause of this and an earlier crash has been identified as corrosion-induced fatigue failure of the vertical tail surfaces, with inspections revealing the presence of similar corrosion in a substantial number of aircraft.

The status of Russia's combat fleet suffered again in August 2010 when the entire fleet of 200 Su-25 aircraft was grounded following the crash of a two-seater during a training sortie over Siberia. This marked the second time in recent years that the VVS grounded its Su-25s. In March 2008, all flight operations of the type were suspended when a single-seat variant came down during a live-fire exercise.

Additionally, in November 2010, a MiG-31 'Foxhound' crashed without casualties over the Perm region in the Western Urals. The entire fleet of MiG-31 'Foxhound' aircraft was initially grounded at the time of the crash, pending an inquest into the crash. The MiG-31 fleet was believed to be operational as at late February 2011 but this was not possible to confirm and the results of the inquest remain unknown. It is standard practice in Russia for the air force to ground an aircraft type in the event of a crash. A 'release to fly' order is then only issued once the cause has been established and any necessary actions have been taken to ensure the safety of the fleet.

Adaptability            TOP

The conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia have provided valuable combat experience, especially against asymmetric enemies. However, this experience has only partially been institutionalised and integrated into wider tactics and training, and as a result most of the air force is still relatively inflexible, trained for conventional, mass conflicts.

Sustainment            TOP

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