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FM 34-1
CHAPTER 3
FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS
If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an
undertaking, I have meditated for long and foreseen what may
occur.
—Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821
In the force projection era, the Army relies largely on a CONUS-based force with a relatively
small forward presence that can rapidly project combat power anywhere in the world. IEW
provides the commander with the intelligence he needs to successfully plan and execute force
projection operations. As stated in Chapter 1, IEW support to force projection operations rests on
the understanding of five principles: the commander drives intelligence, intelligence
synchronization, split-based operations, tactical tailoring, and broadcast dissemination. These
principles, executed in joint, combined, or interagency environments, are critical to successful
force projection operations.
PEACETIME IEW OPERATIONS
Successful IEW support during force projection operations relies on continuous
peacetime information collection and intelligence production. Peacetime IEW
operations support contingency planning and develop baseline knowledge of
multiple potential threats and operational environments. They engage and
challenge the Intelligence BOS to respond effectively to the commanders’
contingency planning intelligence requirements. During peacetime,
commanders conduct critical examinations of Ml force structures, operations,
and training. These examinations ultimately lead to a mission-ready IEW force
which supports the needs of the commander, and meets the key force
projection imperatives of flexibility, scalability, and tailorability.
Peacetime IEW operations are particularly important to corps and division
commanders. In force projection operations, the Army force (ARFOR) in the
joint force will be drawn largely from CONUS-based corps and divisions. In
addition, a corps or division commander could also be appointed the ARFOR or
JTF commander. Corps and division commanders must, therefore, be prepared
not only to provide the ARFOR to the JTF but also to assume the duties of the
ARFOR or JTF commander. Both responsibilities require the commander to
place additional emphasis on intelligence readiness. The corps and division
commanders need intelligence to support contingency-based training and
planning. They need the broad understanding of the operational environment
of the contingency area that comes from continuous interaction with higher
echelon and joint intelligence organizations. Commanders must focus and
drive the intelligence system daily to ensure this support is available and that
their forces and staffs are ready to conduct force projection operations.
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FM 34-1
IEW AND THE STAGES OF FORCE PROJECTION
IEW supports the eight stages of force projection operations.
Mobilization.
Predeployment activity.
Deployment.
Entry operations.
Operations.
War termination and postconflict operations.
Redeployment and reconstitution.
Demobilization.
These stages are not necessarily distinct or sequential and therefore present the
commander with planning and execution challenges.
Intelligence personnel
and organizations must be prepared to assist the commander in overcoming
these challenges.
IEW operations must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all potential
threats to the force as a whole throughout force projection operations. This is
especially critical during the deployment and entry operations stages of force
projection. During these stages, US Forces are particularly vulnerable to threat
actions. Intelligence personnel must, therefore, emphasize the delivery of I&W
products that indicate a basic change to the nature of US operations in theater.
Mobilization:
Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are
brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. The
Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES)
and FM 100-17 provide guidance for mobilization of assets for contingencies
and large protracted conflicts or wars. To prepare for and execute
mobilization, commanders and G2s (S2s) should consider the following:
In peacetime, Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) units
plan, train, and prepare to accomplish mobilization and deployment
tasks. MI units establish habitual training relationships with their
supported AC and RC units as well as higher echelon intelligence
organizations as identified in existing OPLANs.
Force requirements are identified in OPLANs and concept plans. Reserve
augmentation programs organize and integrate AC and RC MI units to
meet the requirements in these plans. Individual manpower
requirements for military, civilian, and contractor personnel are also
identified.
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FM 34-1
Selected RC MI units and individuals are alerted then proceed to
designated mobilization stations.
At higher echelons, mobilization prompts MI units that are consolidated
for training to detach their assets to deploying forces.
Mobilization stations and parent units will begin providing current
intelligence to their RC units as mobilization begins.
Predeployment Activity:
Predeployment activity provides the foundation for subsequent force projection
operations. During this stage, commanders ensure AC and RC MI organizations
are trained and equipped to conduct IEW operations. Commanders integrate
mobilization and deployment tasks into unit METL and training. Commanders
also emphasize and integrate critical aspects of force projection into battle tasks
and planning.
In planning force projection operations, the commander establishes intelligence
requirements which direct peacetime intelligence operations supporting
contingency planning. Key contingency planning ingredients are to stay out
front in intelligence planning by developing broad baseline knowledge on
contingency areas, and to understand how to get intelligence support. As
OPLANs are activated, the commander focuses on intelligence to support
specific mission decisions and planning requirements. In addition, the
commander begins planning for the crossover point in intelligence when initial
reliance on higher echelon intelligence is replaced by tactical IEW assets within
the AO. See
Figure 3-1.
The G2 (S2) supports peacetime contingency planning with IPB products and
data bases on likely contingency areas. The OPLAN identifies the IEW
requirements supporting that plan, to include--
Identification of MI units providing IEW support, both in and outside the
AO
Command and support relationships of collection assets (agencies and
systems) at each echelon.
Report and request procedures not covered in unit tactical standing
operating procedures.
Sequence of deployment of MI personnel and equipment. Early
deployment of key MI personnel and equipment is essential for force
protection and combat readiness. Composition of initial and follow-on
deploying IEW assets is influenced by MEIT-T, availability of
communications, availability of lift, and ability of the national collection
system to support the operation.
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FM 34-1
•
Communications architecture supporting both intelligence staffs and
collection assets. Signal commands must be involved in communications
planning.
•
Friendly vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence threats and plans for
conducting OPSEC, deception, and other force protection measures.
MDCI personnel must begin this type of planning as early as possible to
ensure adequate force protection of deploying and initial entry forces.
The OPLAN also establishes collection strategies and plans that will activate
upon alert notification. For smooth transition from predeployment to entry,
intelligence staffs must coordinate collection and communications plans before
the crisis occurs.
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FM 34-1
The G2 (S2) and MI units must continually monitor and update their OPLANs to
reflect the evolving situation, especially during crisis situations. National
intelligence activities monitor regional threats throughout the world and can
answer some intelligence requirements supporting the development of OPLANs.
The commander and G2 (S2) must be proactive in focusing national and theater
intelligence on emerging requirements.
Upon alert notification, intelligence staffs update estimates and IPB products
needed to support command decisions on force composition, deployment
priorities and sequence, and the AO. At the strategic level, planners use the
updated IPB products to assist in developing the logistics preparation of the
theater plan which attempts to minimize requirements for strategic lift and
maximize the in-theater support capabilities. MI organizations at all echelons
reassess their collection requirements immediately after alert notification.
Collection managers begin verifying planning assumptions within the OPLANs.
MDCI and other IEW personnel provide force protection support to optimize
OPSEC and antiterrorism measures.
Throughout the predeployment and deployment stages, intelligence activities
provide deploying forces with the most recent intelligence on the AO. G2 (S2)
and MI units also update technical data bases and situation graphics.
Deployment:
Success in force projection operations hinges on the capability of airlift and
sealift assets to move forces to the AO, as well as the timely deployment of air-
and seaport transportation, terminal, and deployment control units. The size
and composition of forces requiring lift are based on METT-T, the availability of
pre-positioned assets, the capabilities of host nation support, and the
forward-presence of US Forces. Force or tactical tailoring is the process used to
determine what is the correct mix and sequence of deploying units.
One of the first tailored IEW assets to deploy with the force G2 (S2) is the DISE.
The DISE is the initial forward intelligence support team of split-based
operations. The mission of the DISE is to provide the deployed commander
accurate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence in support of the rapid
introduction of US Forces. Depending on the size and mission of the deployed
force, the DISE may be the only MI asset actually deployed in-country to support
the G2 (S2). In large operations, the DISE may deploy with and support the
early entry force G2 (S2) until the complete processing capability of the unit’s
ACE arrives. Once the ACE is in place, the DISE rejoins the ACE, moves forward
to support the tactical command post, or moves to wherever its capabilities may
be required. The two types of tailorable DISE configurations are the Mini-DISE
(manportable packages), and DISE (vehicular). Together, these DISE
configurations provide the commander with a robust intelligence capability in
support of a deploying force.
Figure 3-2
provides an example of two possible
initial entry packages.
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