Outcome_MSC771.pdf

ISPS Code Update

following

The 77 th Session of the Maritime Safety Committee

IMO Headquarters, London

28 th May to 6 th June 2003

Summary of the deliberations of the Maritime Security Working

Group by Angus L McLean, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping

ISPS update following MSC 77 (June 2003)

Page 1 of 8

Marine

International Maritime

Organization

Outcome of the 77 th session of the

th session of the

session of the

Maritime Safety Committee

28 May – 6 June 2003

6 June 2003

Marine

The Maritime Safety Committee

(MSC) met in London for its 77 th

session between 28 May and 6

June 2003. Maritime Security was

a major topic for discussion and the

Maritime Security Working Group

(MSWG) was convened under the

chairmanship of Mr. Frank Wall of

the UK Department for Transport.

MSWG Report

• 56 Page report to MSC

• (MSC 77/WP.15)

• 21 Recommendations

• All accepted by MSC

Marine

The MSWG produced a 56-page

report on their deliberations. The

report contained 21

recommendations to the MSC. All

of these recommendations were

accepted.

MSC 77 & the MSWG

• SOLAS Amendments and the ISPS Code can not

be amended before they enter force

• However, Circulars and Resolutions can be made

on “Interpretation and Implementation”

Marine

Recommendations

• Does not change the text, or intent, of the ISPS

Code

• Major impact on how the Code will be applied

• Indicative of future changes

• Important for all involved in the industry

In keeping with IMO protocol, the

SOLAS amendments and the ISPS

Code, which were adopted at the

Diplomatic Conference in

December 2002, would not be

amended until after they enter into

force in July 2004. MSC would

produce a number of “Circulars”

and “Resolutions” to give guidance

on interpretation and

implementation of the ISPS Code.

These recommendations do not

change the text of the ISPS Code

but they do have a major impact on

how the code will be interpreted by

both Flag and Port States. The

recommendations also give an

indication of possible future

amendments to the ISPS Code that

may be made after the Code enters

into force.

ISPS update following MSC 77 (June 2003)

Page 2 of 8

International Maritime

Organization

Outcome of the 77

Outcome of the 77 th

Maritime Safety Committee

28 May

28 May – 6 June 2003

Marine

would have access to the

information only after the ship had

indicated its intention to enter port

and Coastal States could access

information on all ships within 100

miles of their coast. Restricting

information in this way poses a

number of technical problems.

These problems were passed to

the Radio-communication, Search

and Rescue (COMSAR) sub-

committee for resolution. Ships

may turn off LRIT equipment in

similar circumstances to those

when it is permissible to turn off

AIS equipment, but they must

inform their Administration that

LRIT has been disabled.

Long-range identification and tracking

• Some call it “Long Range Targeting”!

• May (will) eventually become SOLAS XI-2 Reg 14

(in 2006?)

• “Worldwide AIS”

• Cost of “Ship Station” borne by Industry

• Other costs borne by Governments

• AIS information is available to all in VHF range

• LRIT information is “secure and confidential”

Although not yet in SOLAS XI-2 or

the ISPS Code, Long Range

Identification and Tracking (LRIT)

was discussed by the MSWG. LRIT

can be thought of as a form of “long

range AIS”. Whereas AIS is a VHF

based system whereby safety

related information regarding ship

movements is made available to all

in VHF range, LRIT transmits this

information via satellite and

enables ships to be identified and

tracked anywhere in the world.

Industry groups indicated that the

introduction of LRIT may increase

costs and enable ships to be

“targeted” at long range. MSWG

agreed that LRIT information

should be “secure and confidential”

and that the costs of obtaining LRIT

information should be borne by the

Contracting Government

requesting the information.

Marine

FPSO and FSU

• Not subject to the ISPS Code

• Subject to the security

requirements of the country

of location

• Should have security

measures to prevent

“contamination” of visiting

ships.

• Will they?

The application of SOLAS XI-2 and

the ISPS Code with regard to

“Floating Production, Storage and

Offloading” (FPSO) facilities,

“Floating Storage Units” (FSU) and

“Single Buoy Moorings” (SBM) was

also discussed. It was agreed that

SOLAS XI-2 would not apply to

such units and that they should be

considered to form part of the

“Offshore Facilities” where they are

located. As such they would be

subject to the security requirements

of the country in which they are

located. Such arrangements

should be sufficient to prevent

visiting ship being “contaminated”

by interfaces which are not covered

by the ISPS Code.

Marine

Access to “LRIT” information

• Flag State –Worldwide

• Port State – Once “intention to enter” is received

• Coastal State – Within 100 nautical miles of coast

• LRIT can be turned off by the ship in certain

circumstances

• Flag MUST be informed if such action is taken

Access to LRIT information will be

limited as follows: Flag States may

access information on their ships

on a world-wide basis, Port States

ISPS update following MSC 77 (June 2003)

Page 3 of 8

Marine

ISPS Part B: Mandatory or not ?

Company Audits under the ISPS Code

• Proposal to have “Part B Compliance” marked on

the ISSC not accepted by the MSWG

• Compromise position:

“ISSC would not be issued unless para 8.1 to 13.8

of Part B had been taken into account….”

• Does this, de facto, make Part B mandatory?

• Agreed in principle

• Not before 1 July 2004 !

• A long term aim of IMO

Between the Diplomatic

Conference in December 2002 and

MSC 77 there has been much

discussion on whether Part B of the

ISPS Code should be considered

“mandatory” or merely “advisory”.

The MSWG agreed that the ISPS

Code places many requirements on

the companies that operate ships

and that it was not possible to

verify compliance with all of these

requirements during a shipboard

verification audit. As such, audits

of the company itself would be

beneficial. Recognizing the short

timeframe for complying with the

ISPS Code it was decided that

company audits would remain a

long-term goal and would not be

made a requirement before July

2004.

It was proposed that International

Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)

should be annotated to indicate

whether Part B of the ISPS Code

had been complied with. This

proposal was not accepted by the

MSWG. Instead it was agreed that

an ISSC would only be issued

when “Paragraphs 8.1 to 13.8 of

Part B had been taken into

account”. The MSWG did not

elaborate on the difference

between “taken into account” and

“complied with”.

Marine

The principle of “Non Compliance”

• The major discussion topic of the MSWG

• A proposal would have seen the adoption an

similar approach to ISM

• Not accepted by the MSWG

The International Association of

Classification Societies (IACS) had

raised a number of issues with

regard to implementing the ISPS

Code. The first concerned how

long a Ship Security Plan (SSP)

must be implemented onboard a

ship before compliance with the

Code can be verified. IACS

proposed a minimum of 2 months.

The MSWG did not agree a

minimum time scale as this could

be seen as effectively bringing

forward the entry into force of the

ISPS Code.

IACS also raised concerns that

problems may be encountered with

the current pass / fail regime for

verifying compliance with the

requirements of the ISPS Code.

As the ISPS Code is largely

management systems based, there

may be circumstances when a “non

conformity” that would preclude the

issue of an ISSC could not be

cleared unless the ship is allowed

to continue trading. In the plenary

session, many members were

ISPS update following MSC 77 (June 2003)

Page 4 of 8

adamant that only “full compliance”

would be acceptable where

security was concerned. To accept

any form of non compliance may

be seen as being “soft on security”

and may therefore be unacceptable

to their governments.

and an action plan agreed. The

action plan is to detail how the

“failure” will be corrected, the time

scale for correction and any

alternative security measures that

will be put in place until the “failure”

is corrected. If the agreed action

plan is not followed or alternative

arrangements are not put in place,

the Administration may withdraw

the ISSC.

Marine

“Non Compliance”

• We do not have “non compliance” we have

“failures” or “deviations”

• We have “failures” which DO NOT effect the ships

ability to operate at Security Levels 1 – 3

• We have “major failures” which DO effect the

ships ability to operate at Security Levels 1 – 3

• Issue of the ISSC is a special case ….

Marine

The certification process

• Is it an audit similar to ISM ?

• Is it an inspection similar to Safety Equipment?

• Hardware requirements: 100 % Inspection at

every “verification”.

• Procedural requirements will be subject to an

audit based on “representative samples”

As the terms “non conformance”

and “non compliance” were

deemed unacceptable, the terms

“failure” and “deviation” were

introduced to describe a “failure to

meet a specified requirement”.

These failures were further

classified into those that do not

affect the ships ability to operate at

security levels and those that do . It

was also agreed that all ISSCs

must be issued “clean”. No

“failure” can be present when an

ISSC is issued, regardless of

whether the failure(s) affect the

ships ability to operate at security

levels or not.

Discussions were held on how the

verification process should be

carried out. Operational, or

procedural, aspects will be subject

to audit using a representative

sampling process in a similar

manner to ISM. Any “security

equipment” will be subject to a

100% inspection at each

verification. “Security equipment”

is any equipment that is mentioned

in the Ship Security Plan (SSP) that

has a security function. This

equipment will include any “dual

use” equipment such as deck

lighting that is used for normal ship

operations in addition to its role for

security.

Marine

“Failures” at other times

• “Major Failure”: Reported immediately to

Administration (or RSO) and Port State, along

with remedial “action plan”. Additional

verification will be required.

• “Minor Failures”: Reported without delay to

Administration (or RSO) with action plan for

corrective action. Additional verification may be

required.

“Failures” at other times must be

reported to the Administration (or

Recognised Security Organization)

ISPS update following MSC 77 (June 2003)

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